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THE SEARCH FOR EUROPEAN UNITY: 
FROM THE MARSHAIJ, PLAN TO De GAUI,l,E 
Paul William Green 
Lehigh University, 1964 
" 
• 
It would appear that the solution to the coamon and 
weighty problems facing Western Europe must be sought, in 
0 
the long run, on a political plane. The road ahead is a 
lengthy ~nd arduous one, the stumbling-blocks and pitfall• 
.. , 
many and deep. 1,evertheless , ti1e goal of unity has been 
set and it is with the difficulties inherent in ita attain~ 
aent that this study concentrates. 
The political concept of European union, which 
underlies the endeavor of recent schemes, is not necessarily 
the by-product of modern civilization. Dreams and schemes 
' / .i 
' :, 
of a "united Europe'' have come and gone for centuries. 
However, the vision of possible unification was first given 
authoritative expression in 1946 by Winston ~hurcbill. 
The aspirations of $D integrated Europe found 
aapport among those perceptive enough to realize that tbia 
solution was perhaps the \;Ontinent's only salvation in a 
world of change. The ravages of war, economic dislocation, 
the decline of tbe old iwoirld giants and the iris@ of the two 
new poles of power. had made it clear that survival might 
depend upon an end of nationalist conflict& and the creatian 
· of a unified F.!urope • 
... 
.. 
2 
In the postwar era, the bastions of European 
national separatism were subjected to repeated assault• 
of a conceptually dichotomous nature. Some of these 
assaults, like the European Defense Community, failed. 
Others, like the ~uropean Coal and Steel ~ommunity, have 
. 
met with & !Dilrked degree of success, for here, the dreaaera 
bad yielded to pragmatists and administrators. Soae,sucb 
as the Council of Europe, must not be overlooked in terms 
of the lessons it provided, for the ~ouncil at once kept 
alive the idea of unity and demonstrated the difficulty ot 
creating such a concept. To date, the most dramatic, am-
\ 
bitious and successful program has been undertaken by jbe 
six members of the Eu.ruropean Economic Community. 
Today, Western ~urope stands on the eve of a deci-
sive phase in its political evolution. Deep inroads have 
already been made in the present structure of independent 
and solereign states. It is evident that in the pogtwar 
period western Europe has been moving, if uncertainly, 
toward new forms of organization based on the recognition 
of some measure of closer cooperation. 
Progress has been slow and laborious, and of late, 
fraught with obstacles. For despite the sig~ificant 
successes of the EEC, a sombre political cloud portends h 
the return of Eu~opean nationalismo In 1963, President 
De Gaulle, by denying Bri ttID.ifill &Tlcce~s to c,t,i t t le EMlrope)" 
convincingly interposed France between the Continent and 
tbe European vision. 
, 
j. 
• 
... 
.,. 
I/ 
' ' . • ., .'!-'~ 
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In this preaentation an atteapt has been aade to 
canvass some of the problems which have arisen in Europe's 
trials to discard, to some degree, the nation-state system. 
'c 
j ',,' ' ' • ' The natural temper of modern Europe, prosperous, sick of 
war, sophisticated and sceptical, may well have bad its 
aeasure of the past. Having experienced extreme nationalis• 
and found it lacking, ~urope has sought a radical change in 
its politico-economic relationships. The EEC is the resul~ 
Hut there remains the danger of a Gaullist Europe founded 
on the cornerstones of sovereign nation-states. 
t 
.~ 
' 
' 
:.·· 
. ' ~ 
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• . , 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tbe needs of the twentieth century•a technological 
civilization, with the requireaents for large-scale poli-
tical and economic orga.nizatioim 9 are increasingly sharpeniig 
the conflict with the pr®sent nation~staie system. 
In Western Europ0 9 the Second World War accelerated 
and brought this conflict to the surface. In the postwar 
period, when Western Europe came face to face with her 
economic problems, the shortcomings and obsolescence of 
the nation~state system were amply demonstrated. It was 
out of these difficulties that a broader European unity 
suggested itself as a way toward the solution of economic 
and political difficulties. 
Thi~ presentation centers, primarily, on the efforts 
., 
of the continental states of Western Europe, where the 
drive toward European unity made its greatest advance. 
In this study an atternpt has been made to present a 
realtstic pictu~e"of the initial developments, progress 
and setbacks of the immediate postwar impulses to unity. 
The emergence of the pro-European g~oups in Western 
Europe after World War II, and i~e ~ttempt ~t political 
unific~tion wit~in the Louncil of Europe, have been can~ 
vassed in some detail. ,. 
Thia attempt failed, but the European idea was 
carried on by the six states of nLittle Europe~ on whose 
integration efforts the study further concentrates. 
~----.-----------------------------------~cllll!Cll!l!!l.-
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The second chapter presents the new approach of 
"Little Europe°' toivard supranational cooperation as ea--
bodied in the Schuman Plan. Integration of the coal and 
steel resources through the European Coal and Steel Commu-
. nity was to be the first step toivard further cooperation ) 
\ 
1 &111ong the six member states 9 end this it was hoped would 
U\' lead ultimately to a political federation of the "Inner 
Six." The successful acceptance of the Schuman Plan by the 
parliaments or "Little Europe" represented an important 
step to\vard a closer \Western H~uropean cooperation. 
The third chapter concerns itself with the European 
Economic Community and its adjunct, Euratom, which since 
1958 overshadowed and partially absorbed the original ECSC. 
The European idea, in spite of several setbacks and the 
rather unsuccessful performance of the ECSC in the. poli-
tical plane, not only survived but gained broader accep-
tance. The European Economic Community took on a differait 
organizational form. The radical conception of an inde-
<;) pendent supranational High Authority was abandoned, and 
the EEC was built on the assW1ption that integration could 
( best be carried out by the governments reprssented in the 
council of Ministers. In the economic sphere, the EEC baa 
achieved considerabl® s~ccess, but the Community's politi-
cal progress bas been severely curtailed by international 
events and the new conception of European unity ~@wBlfil\ced 
by President D~ Gaulle. While the ultimate aim @f the 
Community is federation, De Gaulle's project is based on 
,, ' 
,. 
6 
. 
tbe idea of a confederacy ot European atatea: France's 
dissenting voice bas brought the European Community and 
tbe idea of supranational cooperation once more to a criaia, 
yet unsolved. 
In this study an attempt bas been made to present a 
realistic picture of the development, progress, and set-
backs of the European vision of unity, its modest but 
steady advance, its necessary adjustment to new political 
situations and its struggle with the many difficulties on 
the still very long and difficult road toward European uniQ'. 
·-··· 
7 
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CHAPTER I 
#_ 
,:•.·· 
THE SEARCH FOR UNITY 
-----
Probleas !! West E~opean Reconstruction 1945-1947 
Postwar Europe offered in 1945 a picture of desolation 
and confusion. The crisis was certainly acute in the West 
European states where economic dislocatio~ caused by war 
went tar deeper than even the most in.foirmed experts realized. 
Pre-war Europe did not constitute an economic unit any aore 
than she constituted a political one, but the mosaic of her 
nation-states was bound together in an invisible web of 
economic interrelationships and interdependence which existed 
independently of the political organization. In the rather 
na~row way of European thinking the sovereignty of tbe 
:\l 
~ 
na,ion-state was an end in itself, while the bonds of econo-
mic interdependence were considered to be natural and were 
taken for grantedo Few were aware of the existence of 
these bonds, fewer of their functioning and their signi-
ficance for all aspects of European lite. 
Wor,ld \Var II shook the European syste• to 1 ta foun-
dations. The legacy of Hitlerrs Geraa~y ••• an economic 
disaster of unp~~c~dented magnitude: 
The iop~ct of the wGUr in terms of physical de-
,truc~i@~ @K indu~t~yg transport, agriculture, 
aDd ot~ew ~~ti@~~l resourrces has been fully re-
cognize(dl·becl8lm1Se tills rresunllis @Sf such destruction 
were visible sumd m@~e~~ableo The inwisibl® de-
vastati@r.m tJfr<a>lllght by tlhl® CT©llr tJ~s; llees ohlwi@ua and 
i t,s consequences more d if f icul t to assess o It 
aanifested itself in deterioration, rather than 
r'-!--!': 
.,.'·•:: 
''f 
). 
II 
8 
destruction, of capital and man-power, and in 
economic dislocationso In the industrial and 
transport sectors~ ~ete~ioration of plant and 
equipment tvms tA1e rresuJlt ltDotn11 of obsolescence 
and of overr-(l)Jtp.ll@it~tiorm <dltrnrrirrng seweral years 
of war, without adequate maintenance and re-
placemento' There ~as & parallel deteriormtio~ 
of soil feriiliiyo Th® productive c~pacity of 
the populatio~ ~as reduced owing to the war 
exhaustion~ undernourishment and loss of tech-
nical sltilla o l 
It was evident even during the war that European 
recovery would be a difficult problem to solve. On 
British initiative an Allied conference was held in London 
in Septembe~, 1941 9 to prepare estirn&tes for the relief 
and rehabilit&tion of the devastated continenio The 
Americans, being still neutral at that time, were not re-
presented, but the United States Embassy in London assured 
the other delegates with promises of cooperation once re-
construction began. ·The discussion and work on the 
reconstruction plans continued after 1942 with the direct 
.Participation of American experts. However, it soon· 
becam~ Qpparent that Europeans and Americ~ns held diftereia 
views, not only on the reconst~uctio~ problem, but also on 
t..be approach to and method for solving that problem. The 
Americans considered reconstruction a single indivisible 
. 
problem 9 while the European experts, still thinking in 
terms of past experience, limited themselves to working 
out reconstruction plan• on a nation-state basis. 
I United Nations Econoaic ~eport 194S-!:z.,(United Nation• 
Publications, 1948, II, C.I), p.123. 
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Tbe Aaerican idea of dealing with reconstruction 
problems led to the creation @fa special international 
organia:,atioi!l; United Natioxms Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration. This was accomplished at an international 
conference on November 9, 1943, in Washington, atte~d®d 
by representatives of 44 nations. UNRRA bee since been 
regarded as one of the most important international or-
ganizations working directly and effectively for the 
benefit of mankind. 2 UNRRA was conceived as a provisional 
organization for iD1111ediate ~eeds because the United States 
was anxious tow the devastated countries to return aa 
quickly as possible to normal conditions. Its first two 
directors-general, Herbert e. Lehman and Fiorello e. La~ 
Guardia, built UNRRA into a most efficient international 
organization. They staffed it with personnel numbering 
over 12 9 000, recruited fro• forty~eigbt different nation•~ 
and working under an oath that they would "adhere to the 
ideal of international cooperation and would abstain fro• 
any act of discrimination on account of race, nationality, 
creed, or political beliet.•3 The organization operated 
1! 
witb initial capital of nearly 4 billion dollars, contri-
buted by forty~eigbt nations(tbe United Stat,s contributed 
2 Geoffrey G. Goodman,"UNRRA in Perspective,"Yearbook ot 
,~World Affairre(London: Stevens and Sons,Ltd. ,194S)p.1R. 
-=F~=i;i #Akli.cr.:D-3> m::l §I; r 
Ibid., p.201 
"' 
'1 .. 
u. 
10 
73 percent). 4 ..... 
The achievements of UNRRA were imaense, despite the 
agency's DU11erous tasks and the inadequacy of its capital 
sumso UNRRA's actions in the face of the destruction and 
disorganization of World Wrur II made the immediate postwar 
transition considerably easier. However, limitations in 
funds and time, together with increasing political diffi-
culties prevented it from working out a comprehensive 
. 
recovery program on a b~oad inte~national basis. UNRRA, 
nevertheless, prov~d to be a testimonial to American or- 0 
ganizational ability and updated technology. The European 
governments praised UNRRA's work, decorated its high offi-
cials, and in June 1947, regretted sincerely the end of its 
operation. However, the majority of European decision-
•akers regarded UNRRA's American method of dealing with 
reconstruction problems on a supranational basis with 
considerable scepticism. 
Io the two years following the end of hostilities 
the European states bad tried to regain their prewar poli-
.. ~· 
tical status with little regard for their actual postwar 
potential. To m·ake the situation more complicated, all 
West European governments bad their own ideas on recovery 
' policies, which they considered to be a matter of internal 
affairs. They defended such policies on national ideo-
4 The~ His tori ~ the United ~atiof!& Relief and J!ehati!i-
fat1on Adiiinistraiioo,(New York: Colua6IaTnivers1ty Press; rrmo); p. f4. I I 
I 
I 
11 
logical grounds, an attitude which excluded supranational 
cooperation!. pri~~i. The various national reconstruction 
plans were only partially successful because all efforts 
bad been concentrated on bringi~g productioa back to prewar 
levelso Even though by 1947 the majority of the West 
European states had reached this goal the general situi&iCII 
did not improve m~ch for the following reasons: (1) the 
West Europe&Im ~conomy was based on exports and exchange, 
but foreign trade was crippled by the growin! inflation 8111 
lack of hard and convertible currency;(2) the colonial 
powers counted heavily on the economic cont~ibutions of 
their overseas possessions, but with the exception of the 
Belgian Cong-0-, these expectations proved false. The rich 
and developed dependencies were in political turmoil, wbila 
the underdeveloped and poo~ly administered colonies could 
be made profitable only with a considerable investment of 
capital, skill and time, none of which was available in 
Europe. Aaerican loans to individual countries, even it 
·, 
substantial, were dissipated in meeting a.series of imme-
diate cirises without solving the basic reconstruction 
problems. 5 
The occupation ot Geraany further complicated the 
European reconstr~ctioD problemo British~French policiea 
toward Germany, as well as those of the Benelux countriea, 
s Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Moveaeot, (New York: Praeger, ID!9r,-p:,. 
. I 
•. 
'. 
I 
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assuaed a long period of ailitary occupation and tbe re~ 
duction of German industrial output to a level of 50 per-
cent of 1938 standarda. Few seemed to realize that Germ8J:\Y 
waa not only a war forge but also an economic market and 
tbat econo1aica and politics as ivell as peace and prosperity 
were indivisible. The occupation of Germany proved to be 
a liability rather than an asset for·tbe British. For 
France, the incorporation of the Saar into her economic 
system did not improve the ec9nomic or political position, 
and led only to a decade-long dispute with Germany. In 
December 1946, nri tain, reluctant to bear the c«>'stly burden 
of occupying her slice of Germany, agreed to a aerger of btr 
~one with that of the United States. 
As ea~ly as mid-1946 it became apparent that neither 
France nor England were able to resume their prewar roles 
as great powers. The progressive deterioration of American-
Soviet relations not only complicated the ~olitical situaun 
of the West European countries, but also destroyed French 
and English hopes to act as potential mediators between 
West and East. 6 The Anglo-French ~e&ction to the threat-
ening cold ivar was the Treaty of Dunkirk of March 4, 1947, 
a virtual ~e~®wal of the Entente Cordiale. However, thia 
policy alone did not satisfy Sir Winston Cbu~cbill 9 ~ho, 
on the following day elt Fu.lL ton 9 fb1iasouri, advocated a clo• 
cooperation or the English-speaking countries aa tbe best 
6 Black and Thompson, Foreign Policies in a World. of Chaa, (New York: Harper and Row, '1§63J, p:42aiid ·p.,!!. -
\ 
' ·. 
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safeguard for peace against the "expanaive proselytizing 
tendencies" of international communism: "If the population 
of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to. that of 
the United States, there will be no quivering, precarioua 
balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or 
adventure. On,tbe contra~y there will be an over~belaing 
assurance of secnrity.n7 Churchill saw in a closely knit 
Anglo~Saxon unity the best counterbalance against inter-
national communism, while the ~e~ American policy of con-
tainment, just then beginning io take shape, was aimed at 
alignin~ under United States leadership, all potential 
anti~communist forces on a world-wide basis. The Americans 
recogni~ed the vital importance of the close cooperation 
" 
with the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth but 
reasoned that the containment policy would succeed only it 
_,, it were conceived on a frur broader basis than that proposed. 
The most obvious and dram~tic challenge to Europe's 
survival was that of the rapidly rising postwar Soviet 
power. Thus, the magnitude of the problems that faced 
Western Europe at the end of the Second World War neces-
/; 
aitated, at the very least, some form of economic coop-
-
eration. At the end, of 1946 and early in 1947 the siilatioa 
~t Western Europe became critical almost to the point of 
economic ru1d political collapse. It became clear that not 
even 10 billion dollars in loans and 5 billion dollars in 
7 New York Tiaea, March 6, 1946. 
r 
.... 
.. 14 
gifts froa the United States would autoaatically enaure 
European recovery. oritain alone in July 1946 contracted 
tor~loans from.the United States of 3o7 billion dollars 
and 1.25 billion dollars fro• Canada. France,in approxi-
aately the same perio,d, received loans and credits of al>od 
3.2 billion dollars. 8 But these loans were used up in the 
first part of 1947 partly by heavy expenditures for food 
and other pressing needs, partly because the purchasing 
power of the dollar was reduced by the rapid postwar rise 
ol prices in the United States.9 Political probleas ibrtber 
.,.. 
complicated these economic difficulties. 
The Marshall Plan 
The new outlook on, and the more active participatimi 
in world affairs by the United States was annoW1ced by 
Dean Acheson in his speech at Cleveland on May 8, 1947. Me 
declared that "until the various countries get on their 
feet and become self~supporting, there can be no lasting 
peace or prosperity fore· filly of us,,. and suggested "a new 
installment of aid to Europe in the for• of a comprehensive 
program of economic stabilization advantagou• to tbe givtr 
and the receiver alike." lO 
8 John B. Williama, Economic Stability in a !:ihA§fiing World, (New Yorks Oxford University Press, lff3T, p. • · 
9 The ~!)llO@=~l!li (London), CLII, August 3, 1947. 
10 New York Timea, May 9, 1947. 
15 
On June 9, 1947, the Secretary of State, General Marshall, 
speaking at nimrvaurd, presented the idea of the Eu.rope an 
recovery prograa, better known as the Marshall Plan, poimti~ 
out that 
•The United States should do whatever it is able 
to do to assist in the return of normal economic 
heal tfm in the ivorld t~Ji thout tvhich there can be no · 
political st&bility and no assurea peac®o Oarur p~i«J' 
is diweeted not against any ~ount~y o~ doct~ine 
but against hmng0r? powewty~ despe~ati@~ and chaal". 
Such ~asistanceooo@Ust not be on a pie~@=meal basis 
as various criaes develop? but befowe the United 
States gow01rnme11rtt · csum procee_ol rnl!].clm furrtheir in its 
efforts to alleviate the situation and help staa 
the Euiro)Ple~.rm t11or .lldl orrn its tvay to l'recoweiry 9 there 
must be some eagrreement Blmong tile,_ countries of 
Europs as to tll11e requirreu1ent of ti1is situ.at ion ..• 
and t~e initiative m~st come from Europe}1 11 
The British Foreign Secret&rry, Ernest Bevio 9 togetba-
witb the French Foreign t1inister, George Bidault, were the 
... ,-. 
first to ans,veir the call for an immediate conference of 
interested ~uropean nations. Bevin especially saw in the 
Marshall offer an unexpected opportunity not only for adaievilg 
I 
European economic recovery but also fow bringing about a 
change in the Kremlin •s policy through Russian acceptance 
-
ot participation in combined economic eftorts. 12 The 
preliminary three-powe~ conference met on June 27, 1947, 
. p . 1D SlfrASo The B~itish and French saw tbs solution of tbe 
recoverry prrogrr&1 in joi·nt supranational action, but this 
was rejected by the Nussiana as "an infringement on natiCJaal 
sovereignty." Molotov preferred a recovery program on a 
11 
12 
Document• on I~ternatio~a~ Aff~i~•, 1947~1948(Londons Royaf InstTtuie·of International Affairs,1952)pp.23~4 •. 
Arthur He Robertson, Euroeean In~titutions(London: 
Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 19.!ffi), p.6. 
II 
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-
bilateral bast•; an approach which would not only per-
petuate the already existing European difficulties but 
was incompatible, as well, with the American aim of an 
I 
all .... t . . t . l. 13 -~uropean movemen on a Join recow~ry p &no 
, 
, 
On July 3, 1947, th® R~ssians leKi the conference, ~ 
) 
and their withdrawal from the ~uropean recovery prograa,· 
- followed by that of all the East European satellite states. 
resolved many political uncer.tainties. The tvorld tvas now 
divided irnto antagonistic blocs led by the two super-
powerso The political situation, required a reorganization 
of the Western cup. The first steps were taken in tbia 
~irection at the ~uropean recovery conference, attended 
by sixteen European states, in Paris on July 12, 1947. 
Tbe conference resulted in the establishment of a Coamittee 
on European Economic Coo~~ration for the preliminary atuqy \ 
, .. 
of the economic needs involved in a four~year assistance 
program (1948~1951) ~hich was presented to the American 
government in Septsmber. 
The basis of the Marshall Plan and the priae re~ 
quisite of United States assistance to Western Europe 
was close cooperation between all the participating staes. 
When Congiress passed the ~cono1ttic Cooperation Act, on 
April 3 9 1948, allocating 5.05 billion dollars in tbe 
first phase, American assistance was made conditional on 
13nocwaents !! International •ttairs, op. cit, pp.45-47 
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• 
tbe •continuous effort of tbe participating countries to 
achieve a common program for recovery and to set up a 
permanent organization to this end."14 After several 
weeks of negotiations, a convention for European Coopera-, 
tion ~as signed in Paris on April, 1948, which reorgani2e4 
the ~oamittee on European Economic Cooperatio~ 9 estahlJisbed 
the previous year, as a permanent organization with the 
task of implementing the European recovery prograa. 
The beginnings of the Organization of European 
Economic Cooperation were particularly difficult. It 
was to act as a European counterpart of the United State• 
Marshall Plan agency, the ~conomic ~ooperation Administra-
tiono rlut its first comprehensive report was severely 
criticized by the Americans as a simple compilation ot 
statistics, which missed the essential point, namely 
providing for economic cooperation at a supranational 
.P 
levelo 15 This seems to have been a justified complaint tcrin the 
preamble of the Convention the participants recognized 
that their "economic systems are interrelated~ •• tbe pros-
perity of each of them depends on the prosperity of all~ •• 
and eicpressed their determination to "combine their econo-
aic strength ••• increase their production and expand their 
coamerce. •16 
14 
15 
16 
Documents on American Foreign Relations 1947-1948, {Princetoim: Priimceiom University Press, 1950),p.,1 .. 
P~~arrce ll t1airan tm ~ Til1e ri1arrsi1e1l ll P 1l EnIDl g Success or Failure? 
l\larcel Riviere and ·ere 9 = limo)~ 01) G 16i: . -
Documents on International Affairs, oe~ cit., p. 178. 
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However, an important organizational innovation, 
the first of its kind in Europe, proved to be a redeeming 
feature of the OEEC. It consisted of a series of technical 
committees operating on the supranational level:. "Horizcn-
tal" committees were in charge of general economic problema 
coamon to all participants, while "vertical" committees 
dealt t'1itb questions of a more spec'ialized and technical 
,: nature. 
The European governments participating in the MalMelJ 
Plan considered the recovery program a .temporary affair. 
The OEEC, too, was thought of as a temporary~~ hoc 
,A 
association which would lose its raison d 0etre by the end 
of the assistance program. Taking this view, the West 
European governments thought it unecessary to make OEEC 
aore than an advisory organ of coordination, devoid of 
all decision making powers. But under the American influeDiW, 
OEEC tried at the beginning to coordinate the national 
plans of the participants in one general \Vest European 
program. The id®~ met with strong oppositio~ from the 
various gove~nments ~A10 viewed t~is interference by the 
-_ .. 
planners not only as an infringement on their national 
sovereignty, but also on the principles of a free econC111~17 
Because the organs of OEEC could act only in cases 
in which the executive body agreed unanimously, the work 
ef tbe organization, apart fro• the collecting of data, 
17 Andr8 Philip ,'8uroie Unie, (Paris: Presses Universi-
tairea de Fr8Dce,§·5-!J···,··p.ll5. 0 
19 
was limited to collecting the various national plans and 
presenting them to the Americans with only minor changes· 
and/or recommendations. The American attempt to strengthen 
OEEC 0 s position by delegating to it the right to allocate 
United States aid funds only created more dissension aaong 
the participants. However, OEEC put into effect some 
organizational improvements in the distribution of &merican 
aid and succeeded in abolishing the worst restrictions on 
international trade. out its most lasting achievement waa 
the creation of the European Payments Union in 1950 which 
facilitated the inter-European Payments flow of goods and 
'"·\'t-
capital. Other attempts by OEEC to lay down the basis ot 
West European economic irntegiration met ,vitb little success. 
Unfortunately, the political as well as the technical and 
organizational obstacles were too great to be overcome by 
an organization like OEEC. 
The Marshall Plan was organizationally far better 
prepared from the An1erican than from the European side. 
The American counterpart to OEEC, the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) was organized as an independent 
government agency and proved to be far better coordinate~ 
than the OEECo Additionally, ECA was ably staffed and 
administe~ed by top-ranking Ame~ican political and admini-
strative talent, for example, Paul Hoffman and Averell Har-
riaan. I / 
' From its inception, West European politicians bad 
regarded OEEC simply as a stop gap device imposed on the• 
t 
20 
by the United States. To serve in executive capacity 
within OEEC was looked on as a useless task, if not poli-
tical suicide. As a result, OEEC's chief administrators, 
Sir Edmund Hall-Patch~ BaroKh Snoy 9 and Robeirt f1;1rur jolin, 
were highly competent technicians but had neither the 
political experience nor the political stature of their 
European counter,parts. 18 The OEEC's bureaucrats, being 
virtually without political support, were unable to ini-
tiate a constructive supranational policy of economic 
> 
coordination. In the end it was ECA which had to reeval.Ulte 
all the individual programs and introduce a minimu.a or 
19 order and planning into the recovery program. However, 
the main t11ea.knesa of the f\iarshall Plan was its financial 
insecurity. The program 0 s dependence an annual congressicnaJ 
appropriations introduced an element of insecurity into 
ECA planning and prevented the establishment of any long 
range program. 
•. 
One of the most successful measures of the Plan was 
the requirement that every participating government deposit 
with its national bank an amount of national currency 
equal to the val~e of dolla~s weceived K~om the recovery 
program. It was hoped that this reduction 0£ currency in 
circulation would curb inflation, though in special cases 
ECA released such funds for ·•pecifically approved local 
recovery programs. But even this lenient control of ECA 
18 
19 
Marantz, op. cit., p.167. 
Philip, op. cit., p.122 •. 
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was.often by-passed, and aa a result of direct pressure• 
from Washington the funds were freed and then used for 
current expenses rather than for recovery investments • 
. _ The supranational character of the Marshall Plan was also 
weakened by a number of direct bilateral agreements betwem 
the United States and the West European participants. Tbeae 1 
agreements provided a variety of political and economic 
advantages for the United States, but they made ECA's 
Coordination and planning still more difficult. 20 
The Ewropean Recovery Program was forcefully inter-
rupted by the Xorean War which found Europe in 1950 as 
helpless militarily as she had been economically in 1947. 
ECA officially continued its work until the end of 1151, 
but it virtu~Aly came to an end in the first weeks of the -
Korean conflict. The Mutual Security Act of September, 
1951, deprived ECA of its status as an independent agency 
and American appropriations for the support of the Europe111 
civilian economy were sharply reduced, while military aid 
received top priority. 21 
Aaericanhelp under the Marshall Plan, both econoaic 
and later military aid, amounted to slightly over 11 billion 
do 1 lars by June , 1952, v1hen the program came to an end. 
Its impact on the European economy was incontestable: .t .. .- &.. 
20 Karl Loewenstein,"The Union for Western Europe -- Ill~-
sion and Reality 9 n Columbia Law Reviev1, 52 (January-
FebrllJlan<)y ~, 1952) ~ po 122 0 1 " · - =- = 2 
21 Anton1io SpiID.1Helli <> t·arr110 li.:tBltionaJle of European Integration: 
inc. Grave Haines (ed.), ~~r,o~ean Integr~!ion(Baltiaore: 
JohnaHopkins Press, 1957), p.R • · 
J 
industrial and agricultural pr-oductioa in 1952 waa ._ 
above 1938 levels. Considerable economic difficu1i,1ea 
remained, particularly in the poorer countries. In Westall 
Europe as a whole, however, the worst was over. The 
Marshall Plan made a substantial contribution toward 
atabili~ing Europe economically and politically, and as-
sisted her in escaping from a large scale depression, and 
from the danger of social turmoil. It dealt quite suc-
cessfully with the most pressing difficulties of recon-
struction but failed to touch on the basic political and 
economic problems. The United States had hoped that 11 
billion dollars of Marshall Plan aid would help overcome 
economic nationalism and create one market and one EwropaJID 
economy. Instead it only served to reconstitute, with a 
few rather superficial changes, the pre-World War II 
economic and political order. Under the direct protection 
of the West European governments there survived the old 
economic system of intertwined ca1rtels, combines,groupinga, 
and associations. Fixed prices, the control of competition 
and supply, and the use of governmental subsidies to shore 
up these practices were actually much greater evils than 
the criss-crossing frontiers, governmental regulations, 
and trade barriers, at wbicb the United States bad leveled 
its fireo 22 . 
One of the greatest problems of ou~ turbulent ti••• 
82 Thomas a. White, Fire in the Asbea(New Yorks w. Sleane, 
-- - -- ----1953), p.68. 
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ia tbat Allerica, while organizing the world's forces againllt 
coamunis•, speaking in very general terms about freedo• 
and democracy, and dispensing economic help with a genereaa 
band 9 is u.rmable to state clearly what it really stands for. 
Witho@i Marshall Plan aid~ Western Europ@ woul~ have suf-
fered a crisis worse than anything she experienced in the 
dark days of the waro 23 But even this achievement should 
not blind us to the main weakness of the United States-
sponsored recovery program, ioeo, the inability of its 
administrators to articulate clearly the political, social 
and economic goal• of the program. The reason for this 
aight well be the fact that the Marshall Plan was presental 
to Congress as a means to stop the Communist advance and 
as a political instrument of the containment policy, botb 
essentially negative and purely defensive purposes. In 
I_ 
,1947 the ofd system of o~/estern Europe was ripe for a death-
blow, and the Marshall Plan was a unique opportunity to 
change Europe's parochial frontiers and its nineteenth 
century economic patterns without serious opposition. The 
United States may stand to be critici~ed for presenting 
to an exha.usQted armd apathetic Europe organizstionsl scbellea ·· 
beyond the understanding of the common man and lacl[irmg a 
coaprehensive political program which alone could have 
kindled popularr imagination. Nevertheless, the United 
States favored Europe with one of the basic social and 
aaterial prerequisites for development toward an open 
13 Paul-Henri Spaak,"The Integration of Europe,Dreaaa and 
Realitiea,• For~!gq Affairs, 29 (October, 1950) P•~-~. --- --- ---·- -- .. -..... ::: 
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·aociety: a united modern economy and a single co11D10D 
aarket. American economic assistance saved the West 
European economy and succeeded to a certain extent, in 
drawing the continent closer together, but did not ofter 
a solution to the deep~rooted problem of how to fill 
properly the postwar political and ideological vacuua. 
The old pattern of the E~opean nation-state system,even 
though the forces of nationalism are still very strong, 
can no longer aeet the requirements of a aodern technology. 
The Ideas and Groups of the European Movement 
The American policy of containment gave a new 
political meaning and impetus to the idea of European 
unification. It was hoped that it would provide \Vestern 
Europe with a broader basis than the limits of individual 
nation-states to facilitate economic recovery, and that 
the pan-~uropean idea would provide an organized ideo-
logical counterforce to Marxism. Even during the waning 
aoments of \Vor ld War II, President Truman looked Giwi th 
favor on the formation of a European federation to help 
lift the continent out of cbaos."24 But the idea of 
European tDlDlification found a powerful spokeswan in Churchill 
who in 1946 put the weight o,f his political prestige and 
personal energy into an effort to create a common platfo111 
tor the diverse Eur,opean eleaents. What motivated CburclaW 
14 
· George Creel,"Tbe United States ot Europe,• Collier'•• 
116 (December 22, 1945), p.14. 
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25 
to becoae a chaapion of European unity is not quite clear. 
Be may have considered the idea of a united Europe as the 
basis of an American~sponsored and Hritisb led, strong 
Western European allian~e acting as a counterforce against 
the Russians. He personally never committed ~imself to a 
European federation ,vhicb would include England, considering 
this "united Europe as a separate entity to which Great 
Britain, lilte the United States, are related only as friends 
and sponsors."25 Churchill presented his idea of a United 
Europe on December 19, 1946, at the University of Zurich. 
The political implicatio11s of his proposal were kept 
rather vague in view of the fact that his appeal was ad-
dressed to the many varied and divisive European groups. 
Be proposed the building of a "kind of United States of 
Europe" as "a remedy which, if generally and spontaneously 
adopted, would bring a solution to the political and econo-
•ic tribulations of the times." He demanded that France 
and Germany "end their perennial strife" and called for 
the creation of a European Com1ci 1, "26 a body representa-
tive of a ~uropean will. In 1946 nobody doubted tl1at a 
European federation was precisely what Churchill had in 
aind and what be·stood for. 27 But bis reservations ap-
peared only later when European unity began to take more 
25 
26 
27 
Ralph G. Bawtrey, Western EuroP!&I! Union(London:Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1949), p.a7. 
_rJet~ }lo~!£ TI~!!~ September 20, 1946. 
Ball, op. cit., p.4. 
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concrete forms and the British were presaed to answer 
"whither Britain?" 
Churchill as a self-styled leader of ~uropean uni-
ficatio~ ~Qd a strong point in his favor. He had advoca1al 
European unity and creation of a European council with 
other European organs, including a common standi~g army 
during trae war. It could be pointed out that .tn1e .. ~rich 
Convocation speech was just a readaption of his radio 
address to the Nazi-occupied nations on March 21, 1943.28 
~· 
In July, 1944, he had also sponsored the Declaration of t.te 
European Resistance Movement which supported the notion of 
European federation. 29 Few of the West European statesman 
bad such a "European" record in 1946 and none had Ch~cbil.l~ 
prestige. Even if ~hurchill avoided any concrete proposals 
in Zurich and limit·eu himself to an appeal to the European 
conscience and the common cultural heritage and stressed 
the necessity of solidarity against communism, he succeedld 
in giving an unexpected stimulus to the rise and organiza-
tion of groups dedicated to the promotion of a United Europe. 
··,,\ 
The idea of a united Europe had emerged in the 192Jl~s 
and experienced a short period of glory in the Stressman-
tsriand era, but eJtcept for a fe1;v intel.D.eciual deba(ting 
circles, it fell into nearly complete oblivion shortly 
thereafter. Tbeae few groups, even th~ugh they counted 
28 
19 
Winston Churchill, Onward to Victorl(Boston:Little, 
Brown and Company, 1944), p'p.~t:s4. 
Europe Todai and Tomorrow(Paris,December,1953) p.21. 
". 
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' Allong their members some of the better b~aina on the 
continent, could hardly be called a movement. By 1946 
the concept of a unit@d Europe, eve~ if still limited to 
various isolated groups, each with its own idea of Europe, 
bad nevertheless made considerable progress. The political 
concept of Europe was now geographically restricted to tbB 
Western states with "free and democratic institutions.• 
The countries within the Sov~et camp, and to some extent 
Franco Spain were excluded,tbeoretically and pragmatical))'. 
At the time of Churchill 0 s ~nricb speech eight relatively 
prominent pro~European groups affiliated with the three 
aain West European political currents -- liberal, Roman 
Catholic and socialist -- were already in operation, each 
of them viewing ~urope in the light of its own ideology: 
The liberal conception of a ~ited Europe was a 
moder~ Holy Alliance of the capitalist states 
based on humanist and democ~atic traditions; The 
catholics s~w i~ Europe~n unity a modernized Holy 
Roman Empire; and fo~ the socialists it was es~ 
aentially a third world force. 30 
The libe~als were the most important and most nuaer-
oua of the European groups, had the best financial backiq;, 
and in many ways the most realistic approach to European 
unityo The most significant liberal group was the EUiropean 
League £or Economic Cooperation, operating in France,Belgiua, 
and to a lesser extent in Germany and Italy. It grouped 
together wealthy businessmen and upper-class intellectuall., 
.. · .... _: '·, .. (· 
30 , Bernard Lavergne, •Le Mythe da la petite Europe,"L'Arpee 
P~liti9!8 et Econoaigue, XXX, No. 135 (Paris,1957),p.l. 
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28 
Standing tor a "big-buaioesa" approach to European unifi-
cation, the El.EC bad soae influence not only in Europe 
but also iD the United States. 
The most important and most active European group iD 
terms of political presti@® is the Roman catholic Les Nou-
·= 
velles Eguipes Internationaleso Founded by the French, 
--== cc:::=~.. :, e====-===~ 
this org8J.ID1i~atio~ soon d~e~ together a number of national 
Catholic gwoups composed of the pro-European elites of the 
Roman Catholic parties of \Vestern Europe. After World War 
II the West European Catholic parties made a spectacular 
comeback 9 gaining power in Western Germany, Italy and 
Belgium~ and enjoying great influence in France, Holland 
and Luxembourg. By 1946 the \Vest European catholic leamr& 
were agreed "apparently with the blessing of the Holy See 
on the desirability of a United Western Europe under Catho-
lic leadershipo"31 However, unification did not advance 
very far, partly because of differences in points of view 
between the various leaders on scope and method of action. 
The French Socialist Movement for a United Europe 
occupies a unique position somewhat apart from the other 
aajor ~,:oups. Ti1is elite cadre of prominent intellectuals 
and technocrats was organized by Andre Philip. The main 
ai• of this group was to establish a common European 
aarket and a central European planning agency. The mea-
bers of this gr~up remained isolated, not only fro• their 
.. ,. ........... ·-· 
31 Loewenateia, op. cit., p.60. 
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own party in France, but virtually from the rest of soddian 
as well. They are the only socialist organization actively 
1 engaged in pro-European activities. The regular European 
socialist parties are primarily interested in promoting 
socialism i~ their own countries and have shotWIDl little in-
terest in European unification, except for some of the 
party veterans who are still moved by the old "international• 
spirit. 
The idea of a United ~urope bas remained abstract and 
limited chiefly to a few elite groups, intellectuals, and 
capitalists. It is unlikely that it has penetrated tQ the 
aasses 9 or even significantly affected the middle class.
32 
However, a deep ideological crisis exists among some of 
the leading Western ~uropean groups who recognize the limi-
tation and obsolescence of the nation-state system, but 
are unable to agree on the for• of a supranational organi-
zation. The nation-state with all its shortcomings still 
represents the reality and the fulcrum of ~uropean unity, 
to the extent that it lacks a concrete program, produces 
only abstract or general loyalti~s. As a matter of fact, 
the moment concrete proposals are made, the divisions 
appear. The large gap which exists bet,veen European as-
pirations and desires for far-reaching measures of poli-
tical integration on the one hand and political reality 
on the other, still serves to keep the idea of a united 
32 Ibid. , pp. 62-64. 
30 
Europe out of the real• ot practical politics. 33 
The pro-European groups were small in size, but 
there were many of them, and their members, especially the 
university students, who were emotionally dedicated to tie 
idea and had to be reckoned witbo 34 However, the groups 
lacked modern and comprehensive communication media tbrotgb 
which they could appeal to the people; they often lacked, 
even at the local level, an efficient organization and 
leadership. They esrpecially lacked financial backing which, 
if it had been available, could have solved many of their 
problems. Yet with all their shortcomings they were able 
to make themselves heard, sometimes even at the political 
~evel. It may be safely contended that in the quest for 
unity, the pro-European groups exerted some pressure and 
could not be entirely disregarded. 
The Federalist and Functionalist Approach•• to European 
Unification 
Europeans differed not only in their political viewa 
..... 
about the nature of a united Europe, but also on the method 
of bow to achieve unification. Two schools of thought, 
the "federalist" and the "functionalist," existed from tbe 
~eginning in every important pro--European group. The 
federal conception of European unity was based on the idea 
a 
34 
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of a comaon basis large enough for a political unification, 
the federalists were advocates of the immediate establisb-
aent of a federal political organization. 
The federalists believe that the first step toward 
unification must be political organization,ioeo, th~ crea-
tion of a strong federal government with the power to tax, 
with its own army and administration. Thus it would pre-
. 
sumably be able to override the particularisms of the 
participating nation-states. With the exception or the 
French Socialist Movement for a United Europe the federa-
lists were, and still are, in a majority in s11ll European 
groups and particularly among Catholics. In 1944 and again 
in 1947 they tried to set up an organization of all pro-
federal forces, the Union Eurone~IDl! des E~~!,~~~~!§.'t~s' 
closely associated today with the Nouvelles !~guipes Inter-
nationales. 
Opposing the federalists are the functi11'lnaliata wbo 
prefer gradual development and a pragmatic approach to 
political unification. In contradistinction to, the tedera--
lists who tended to overlook the importance of the econollic 
factors, the functionalists wanted to accomplish political 
unific~tion by a gradual integration of important economic 
sectors. In their belief, the main forces in favor ot 
European unity had their origin in the organizstional 
requirements of modern technology. The functionalists 
reasoned that particularly in the fields of eco~omics, 
scientific research, and defense, these requirements bad 
I, 
'· . 
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outgrown the ratber narrow limits of the nation-state aystea. 
The policy of the functionalists is less spectacular 
because they work for unification through supranational 
agencies already existing and which are mostly of a tecbnt-
-"·<I,''·"····· 
cal character •.. They believe that even though political 
decisions remain in the hands of the national governments, 
the supranational authorities, in performing their technical 
or economic tasks, are creating "invisible bonds." These 
bonds between the participating countries will finally 
oblige the politicians to accept the unifying pattern. The 
·tunctionalists t,ere inspired by ~the ,vritings of Henri de 
St. Simon, Vilfredo Pareto, James Taylor and not least by 
James ~urnham in his Manageria~ Revolutiono The first 
"theoretician" of functionalism in the early 1940's was 
tbe Run1anian David :vti trrany e With tl1e posttva:rr period, came 
Jean Atonnet and Gunnar Myrdal. All three were prominent 
economist-techno~rats, and Mitrany as well as Myrdal were 
recogni~ed seholarso Furthermore, all three were familiar 
with American technology and administration. The functiona-
lists never tried to organize their followers and did not 
even attempt to create a separate school of thought. They 11 
defended their slow, cautious and often painstaking proce-
dures with the patience of bureaucrats, in the fi~m con-
viction that nrit only administrative and technological 
trends, but the very nature of Western civilization were 
on tl1eir side. "Comprur®d to tlae .federalists t'ii tl1 their 
dramatic militancy," the fwictionalists "have obviously 
( 
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tar less emotional appeal for the public."35 Boweyer,the 
European governunents confronted wi tl1 the problem of Europ,an 
unification always preferred the functionalist approach, 
"adopting the federalist points of view·with hesitation 
and halfheartedly only i¥herm forceu by nece0si ty, and dis- .,, 
carding them when the pressure diminished."36 
Tbe Search for Unity 
In March, 1947, after protracted negotiations, all 
important pro-European organizations, including both 
functionalist and-federalist factions, responded to the 
Zurich appeal and joined the Churchill~aponsored organi~ 
zation, United Europe. This institution was a relatively 
loose "umbrella.n orrganization tvhich operated through an 
international policy~making council and an executive orgaa 
charged with administration. Despite being an amalgam ot 
many heterogenous groups, United Europe provided the pro-
European movement iwi th a certain amount of coordination 
and operational framework. 
In U,y, 1948, on Churchill's initiative, United Europe 
called the first European Congress, held at the Hague that 
year. The most promineni and active group of the Congress 
and the most radical within the United Europe organization 
was the International Committee of the Movement fo~ BurqJeaD 
"' Upity. It was an effective spokesman for the West FAlropeaa 
35 
36 
-
Loewens~ein, 02.cit., p. 51. 
Spiaelli, op.cit., p.58. 
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federalists. The federalists who were dissatisfied witb 
the stow progress of West European unification wanted to 
replace the various functional organizations with a poli-
tical authority "with real powers and limited function" 
and strong enough to overri~e .the claims of national -
sovereignty. 37 The federalists with dramatic militancy 
took the initiative and succeeded in dominating the Con-
gress, which approved a series of resolutions pertaining 
to social, cultural, and economic integration. HY far 
tbe most important was a political resolution which 
declared that "the European nations must agree to merge 
certain sovereign rights ifi order to assure security, 
economic independence and social progress."38 The main 
point of all the resolutions was summarized by Salvador 
de Madariaga in an eloquent and emotional "Message to 
Europeans" urging the dismant11ns of divisive nation-
state barriers. 39 The Hague ~ongress, after approving 
the resolutions and adopting Madariaga's proclamation, 
left the further work of unification to the newly=created 
organization, the European ~.qovement. This institution 
was led by Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gaspere, Leon 
Blum, and Paul-Henri Spaak, as the four honorary p~sidenta. 
37 
38 
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quarters in October, 1949, and soon became one of the aoat 
active pro~European organizations. The ultimate goal, of 
course, was an all-European federation including Eastern 
Europe, but its immediate task became the political uni-
fication of Western Europe. 
The) highly successful Westminster Economic Conference 
in April, 1949, resulted from the second meeting of the 
European Movement. It came up with a proposal for a world-
wide free flow of goods, a project of the European Pclyments 
Union, and the nEuropeanization" of the basic industries 
of coal, steel, transport, and electricity under a single 
European institution in charge of central planning and 
general policy. The last propo§al eventually became the 
basis of the Scbumar1 Plano In the cultural field the 
European fi.4ovement cooperated closely with the groups around 
the Center of European Culture and concentrated its efforts 
on the problems of public education. The European Move-
ment also paid considerable attention to the studies of 
aocial problems, particularly to the solution of chronic 
regional unemployment and to the question of free, inter-
national movements of labor. However~ it proved to be less 
auccessful in its efforts to coordinate the work of the 
increasing number of European o~ganizations. Eventually, 
the European Movement, created primarily as an organiza-
~ion w,rking for political unification on a federal basis, 
became the forerunner of the fUJ01ctionalist approach and 
virtually the only functionalist organization. In it1 
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aeetinga and in its organizational studies Buropean uni~ 
fication was projected on a modest but more realistic 
basis, and the concrete projects of economic and technical 
I 
unifi,cation started to take shape. 
From the inception of the A~arshall Plan, and espe-
_, 
cially after the beginning of the recovery program, the 
idea of a united Europe was clearly "in tbe air."40 The 
United States openly favored the idea of a unitod Europe 
and made no secret of its hope that ultimately the Marshall 
-. 
Plan would help build an expanding and integrated Western 
European economy. This American attitude, together with 
the pressures of the developing cold war, were the most 
• decisive factors in infltiencing many ~Vest Ruropean states-
men to support European unity or, at least, to refrain 
from opposing it openly. American pressure and the coa-
11unist danger cau1sed \Vest Europeans to forget, at least 
for a.ivliile, their old ,parochial rivalries and to start 
working together. 
The Ellergen~e of Atlantic ~~ope 
The coming of the Marshall Plan bad changed tbe 
political climate of \festern Europe. It became quite 
apparent that post World War II political and economic 
conditions would require considerable reorganization and 
adjustment on the part of the European powers. Britain 
40 ' Marani•, QR: £1!~, p.181. 
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and France, though still believing tbeaselvea to be maSor 
powers in their own rights, now had to accept substantial 
modifications of their formerly· independent national policies. 
Under the influence of the mounting tensions of the 
cold war and the danger of Communist attack and subversion, 
Ernest Bevin proposed in January, 1948, to consolidate 
Western Europe by establishing, in cooperation with France 
and the tsenelux countries, the foundation of future t'lles t.m 
cooperationo 41 Mr. Bevin was very sceptical about the 
"ambitious schemes of Eu~opean unity" of the numerous pro-
European organizations. Instead he proposed to concentrate 
on a practical program which could be extended "step by 
step" 11.ot only to the:·.metropoli tan territories of ~festern 
~urope but also to their overseas dependencies in Asia 
and Africa. Bevin's project for an "organic West European 
Union based on sound econo1nic principles 0 raised hopes and 
caused some excitement among the pro-European groups. But 
after several weeks of negotiations at Brussels, Bevin's 
fond hopes culminated into an alliance treaty copied after 
the Treaty of Dunkirk of March, 1947. Nevertheless, a 
clause pertaining to economic, social and cultural coope1a 
tion was included, mainly at the intervention of Paul-
Henri Spaak. 
The uruasela Treaty was signed on March 17, 1948, 
and included a ailitary alliance which was open to any 
41 Docwaents !!! International Affairs, oe. cit., pp.201-10 
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West European state. T~e military part guaranteed the 
•.. 
"' signatories immediate assistance, but only in case their 
European territory ires attac!ted 9 tft1e ovEHr-seas terri toriea 
being virtually excluded from this guarantee. The organ-
izational section of the Brussels Treaty called for a 
permanent secretariat, a council of defense 9 comprised of 
the defense ministers of the participating countries, 
together with a permanent military committee made up of 
the chiefs of staff. The council of defense and the 
ailitary committee were given no power of decision. Their 
task was limited primarily to studies of military prd>leas. 
As for the consultative council of ministers, its main 
task was to coordinate military needs and ask the United 
States for military aid"' Th __ ,. economic, social, a11d ceul tural 
',/· 
sections of the Treaty were couched in such vague terms 
that there was nothing that could be put into effect.From 
tbe military standpoint, the Brussels Treaty was not par- .. 
ticularly successful either. In point of fact, the defenae 
council and the raili tary corn1ni t tee produced little in the 
way of positive results until their incorporation into 
the Atlantic Alliance in April, 1949. 42 
42 Next to the Marshall Plan, an important American con~ tribution to West European unity was provided by the Nortl1 Atlantic Treaty Organizationo lVhile tt1e 1\1arshall Pla11 rrestored the Euuropean ecormoojr ~ NATO f1U1lly baclted by the military power of inc United States~ gua~ant~ed the security of Western Europe against the possibility of ConH1n1urnist aggressiormo f~ATO t1itlbl its repeated 11~ef~ence to ttae Atlt1ntic Commtnrrnit.y rtent far beyond an allia11ce in its usLnal rJce@lTiiing, ru1d provided a perrnanent frame-
work for West European cooperation within a broader Atlantic concept. 
tl$ _______________________ _ 
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The attempts at European military cooperatio~, in 
apite of the most serious American efforts in this field, 
were probably the most unsuccessful of all the steps 
toward unification. When the Korean War brolte 4llUlt in 
1950 tVestern Europe, al though a significant industrial 
force, was incapable of defending itself against potential 
Russian aggression;·4-~ It became increasingly evident that /1 
effective defensive strength in Europe would require a 
\) greater degree of integration of existing military forces 
and the addition of l1lest German military strength to the 
j.oint effort. Federation for defense represented a rradical 
step. Yet it seemed imperative, in view of the drastically 
changed conditions of modern warfare, that there should 
be a common, balanced force for the defenae of Western 
Europe. Despite these inescapable facts, the French As-
sembly, by refusing ratification in 1953, dealt the final 
blow to the European Defense Community, a program which 
envisaged a European army, to which each state would con-
.tribute its forces and place them under joint European 
control. 44 Certainly the EDC bad appeared seductive in 
federalist eyes, for it was designed as a supranational 
agency with limited functions but with very real powers. 
Fro• the federalists' viewpoint, the EDC was to limit one 
of the most conspicuous and d81lgerous elements of national 
43 
44 
Spinelli, op. cit., p.58. 
U.W.Kitzinger,"The Politics and Econoaics of Europeag Integration,"(New York), pp.I§::1!. . 
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sovereignty: the absolute supremacy over ·armed force. The 
institution was designed as a cornponent to be built into 
a political frame work and indeed it provided for an 
Assembly dire~tly elected by universal suffrage to wield 
democratic political control. In addition to the control 
envisaged io the EDC treaty itself, more far-reaching 
political plans were mapped out before the EDC came up 
for ratification. However, with the sad demise of the EDC, 
the movement toward the unity of Europe was freed from the 
defense issue, and was able a£,d indeed forced, to return 
to the task at hand. 
The drive for European unity initiated by the Federa-
list groups, to which ~hurchill offered the prestige of 
his name and leadership, had more spectacular than positive 
achievements. It resulted in the establishment of the 
Council of Europe in May, 1949, which included all West 
European nations. 
The initiative for the creation of the Council of 
Europe came not only fiwtom the European Movement but fro• 
tbe Belgian government as well, which agreed to sponsor 
the proposals of the Hague Congress and obtained French 
support for them. In September, 1948, both governments 
presented the project jointly to the permanent council ol 
the BrusselsTreaty powers. 45 What motivated the FrenCb"'" 
and the Belgians to sponsor a pr(kject, judged undesirable 
4S 
... Documents 2 International Affairs, op. cit. ,pp.107-8. 
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\ 
by the British is not clear. British Foreign Secretary 
Ernest B®vin was particularly opposed to the "the abstract 
idea of a European federation,~ and had '~o ~@e for a 
supranational constituent assembly chosen by the European 
parliaments." Instead of seeliing West European political 
federation, Hevin bad in mind a strengthening of the West 
European defense with the military assistance of the United 
States through the already existing B~ussels Treaty organi-
zationo46 As usual the official attitude of the British 
toward European unification was quite reserved. Instead 
of a political confederation the rlritish advocated informal 
cooperation which alone in their opinion could in the long 
run create a true spirit of European understanding. 47 
Britain's reserved views were shared by the Scandinavian 
countries who preferred the policy of regional cooperation 
and considered "the desires for European unity as greatly 
t d b 11 d t . l . . t ,.48 exaggera e ya sma an par 1a minori y. 111 the 
permanent council of the Hrussels Treaty organization the 
British opposed the project of the European parliamentary 
tit 
assembly. They proposed instead the creation of a European 
council of ministers limited to general political matters 
only. In the Bri t.ish scheme of things, the OEEC would deal 
46 Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin(London: Hutchinson, 1952), pp. 257-9. 
47 
48 
J.F.Kover,"Tbe Integration of Western Europe," Political Science .9uarter~:r, 69 (September 9 1954), 359. 
Halyard !\to Lange., nEuuropean Unio1m ~ False Hopes and Realitiea," Fore!gn Affairs, 28 (April, 1950), 441. 
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with economic affairs and the North Atlantic Treaty Oriani-
aation with military matters. 
. . After rather protracted negotiations, the continental 
aeabers of the Brussels Treaty, disappointed with the 
British ~arati=European" attitude, considered creating a 
European assembly without British participation, if neces-
sary. But in January, 1949 9 the British yielded to the 
pressure of their \"Vest European allies and accepted with 
reluctance the European Assembly project. They were re-
solved, however, to make the Counci,J. of Europe '0as little 
.• 
li\,O t B . t . ~ . t ...1- J;J.~ 0 ri .isn in eres~So The 
staate of the Council of Europe, accepted in May, 1949, 
by the five Brrussels Treaty powers, together with Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden was a compromise which 
acknowledged the validity of the Euroirean federal idea 
but deliberately created institutions, such as the com-
mittee of foreign n1inisters and the consultative asse1nbly, 
which were powerless to accomplish anything. 
Indeed, the conuni ttee of foreign ministers of the 
participating states was given 110 authority to make inde-
pendent decisions, its powers being limited to preser1ting 
recommendations to the national governments. Even this 
_,__ modest function was limited by tl1e unanimity rule· in the 
case of '1esse11tial n questions. The already narrow compe-. 
tence of the committee was further limited, not only by 
49 Lord Willia• Strang, Hoae and Abroad (London: A.Deutacla, 1956), P.290. 
- ~ ··--~ I • *--- ,, ~~• -
governmental action of each ot the participating states, 
but also by the existence of other supranational organi-
zations of a military or economic character such as NATO 
or 0EEC in whose functional sphere the committee was not 
.,, to interfere '°on jp)rin.ciple." 
Insofar as the ~onsultative Assembly was concerned, 
that body's representation proved to be a major st•J*'>ling 
' block to its effectiveness and utility. With respect to 
responsibility, the choice of representatives could best 
.. 
be described as haphazard. On the other hand, the selec-
tivity of the Strasbourg Assembly's members served, in 
effect, to represent the aristocracy of West European 
parliamentarianism. As such, these professional politicians 
brought to Strasbourg the formalism, technicalities and 
inhibitions of the parliamentary process and thereby ren-
dered the entire project a disserviceo 50 The Consultative 
Aasembly being wiable to act a11d limited .. ~ mainly to talking 
engaged in a constant but unequal struggle with the commit-
tee of ministers for a greater degree of genuine legisla-
tive power. This task in itself proved to be an impossible 
one. Hut perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
of the assembly powers revolved around the oeep split with-
in the Council between two factors: "one of them for Europe, 
the other against it."51 
50 Loewenstein, op. cit., p.68. 
51 Paul Reynaud, Unite or Perish (New York: SiMn and Schuster, 1952), p.lW. 
\ 
. ,.. .. ' 
) 
44 
The fifteen members of the "Greater Europe• of 
Strasbourg bad vary few interests in common, and the idea 
of Western unity alone ivastoo iwaak as a driving force 
./l 
toward federation. A ,ource of difficulty for closer co~ 
operation between the member states was not only the sover-
eign state of long standing, but also the varying degrees 
of social development and standard of living within: the 
states, and their different views as to the primary end of 
economic policies and methods of approach to unification. 
The federalists had expected too much from the Council of 
Europe, which at best served only as a ;Yest European dis-
cussiog forum. uut if the political unification appeared 
beyond reali~ation, the Strasbourg experience suggested 
realistic possibilities for closer regional cooperation, 
first among the six states of "Little Europe'' and a little 
later for the three Scandinavian states within the Nordie 
Council • 
. ,, The West European ~;eli t and the Decline of Federalism 
During l9t19~l950 ti1e council of Euurope \Vas confronted 
by a dilemE11@0 Should it continue as a symbol of united 
European aspirations, or should it recognize and sanction 
the split of Wes tern Europe? A split t7h ich had resulted 
from the clash of too many special interests and which bad 
J - . 
·, 
led to a di vision iu1to an '°Outer seven" headed by Britain 
and neutral Sweden, interested only on preliminary cooper-
ation, and an "Inner Six," working toward progressive 
45 
',.,, 
integration. 52 The fundamental differences between the 
•six" and the "Seven" brought the council of Europe to a 
political standstill. 
A small hope had rem.ained until 1951 that Britain 
would change its attitude toward internatioriaJl cooperation 
should the introversive Labour Party be replaced by the 
Conservatives who see1ned to take a more positive attitude 
toward cooperation with the continent. This hope proved 
ill-founded. The Conservatives, once in power, continued 
to maiadain the position that the absolute supremacy. of 
Parliament and the natu:re of the Gommonweal th ties preclmed 
any closer cooperation with the continent, even on a 
functional basis. There appeared to be a bipartisan con-
sensus on the position Britain should take on the question 
or supranational cooperation. Certainly, philosophical 
and constitutional principles played a role in these n1attaw 
but behind it were predominately economic consideratioru,. 
i.e., the effects on British trade and industry if its 
principal protection, Commonwealth preference, would be 
washed away ili11 son1e form of supranational arrangement. 
The Scandinavian reluctance to embrace f arre:treaching 
aupranational cooperation was of a purely political nature. 
West European wiification represented the nucleus of a 
future supranational defen~ community, which the Swedea 
judge inco•patible with their traditional neutrality. Aa 
S2 JCover, o,p. cit., p.3M. 
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,, 
46 
•·--r _..,.__._____,.,_...,c.--,._..,_ 
. ' 
a result, they influenced Norway and Denmark to stay out-
side the European movement.53 
As the difference between the "Six" and "Seven" 
increased~ the Swedish delegate, Dr. Bartil Ohlin, pro-
posed that the Strasbourg Assembly recognize within the 
framework of the ~ouncil of Europe the division between 
the ~Outer Seven" and what he called the "little federa-
tion,'0 Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy. A similar 
proposal for a "Little Europe•' ivas presented by the Italian 
federalist Martino Benevenuti. 54 both plans were rejected 
because such a division would l1ave been a death bloiv to 
all the aspirations symbolized by the European Council, 
and because the "Inner Six" nations were not ready for 
political federation even though they advocated it publicly. 
This failure of the federalist approach to West 
European unity encouraged the n1ore realistic partisans 
ot the functionalist approach to advocate an immediate 
but carefully planned step-by-step program to supranational 
cooperation. It was time to stop vvai ting foir the '7ideal 
11omenin f'or political federation; a moment which did not 
appear imminent at all. The functionalist approach, which 
accepted the existence of the nation-state system and was 
willing to settle for a partial subordination of state 
53 
54 
Spinelli, op. cit., p.45. 
Charles Co Walton, "The Fate of Neo-Liber~lis• in West-
ern Europe 9 " The Western Political gu~terly, 5 (Sept. 
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sovereignty and national interest to the ideal of supra-
national welfare, appealed more and more to many West 
European politicians as a reasonalle and realistic solutian. 
Unfortunately, the Council of Europe was unable to reach 
agreement even on the functionalist approach to interna-
tional cooperation, chiefly because this approach becaae 
subject to two different interpretations. 
The British and Scandinavian idea of the functionalist 
approach was a policy of loose cooperation through ad hoc 
~
intergovernmental agencies which would leave state sover-
eignty untouched. The delegates of "Little Europe," on the 
other hand, based their view of functionalism on the legal 
conception of a supranational authority having only limited 
functions but endowed with real powers to modify national 
economic and industrial plans. 55 
At the beginning of 1950 it became evident that the 
Strasbourg Asse1nbly was useless for any practical tasks 
and that under existing conditions even a Llodest proposal 
f 
ot supranational cooperation would fail as a result of the 
paralyzing institutional deadlock in the Council of Europe. 
The division between the ' 9 Inner SixQ1 a11d the uoute1~ !:ieven" 
became a reality without the official sanction of the 
council. It was plain to see that the atmosphere was not 
what it had been at the tiine of the launching of the ~,1ar-
aball Plan. With political stability regained and their 
551 Maurice Edelman,"Tbe Cowicil of Europe," International 
Affairs, 27,(January, 1951). 
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national economies consolidated, the West European statea 
were no longer interested in large-scale supranational 
cooperation. The general improvement of political and 
economic conditions strengthened the conservative force• 
which ivere predominately interested in the maintenance of 
the status quo and were little inclined to engage in the 
risky experiment at the supranational level. 
Unification as conceived by the federalists, had 
little hope of success from its beginningso The federaliat.a 
of the Council of Europe, disregarding all political and 
·, economic realities, had advocated the idea on intellectual 
grounds. Their methodology was the facile employment of 
historical analogies dating back to the time of the Roman 
Empire, the Middle Ages, or early United States history, 
each group following its own intellectual mood, personal 
temper, or political orientat~on. All of these overlooked 
the fact that contemporary ',t/estern Europe, in spite of 
the feeling of external danger, still does not have a 
I ~ .. 
single center of gravity around which her nation-states 
could naturally group to speed the process of unification. 
The Rise of Functionalisa 
-- -~- - -------
By the beginning of 1950, the supporters of European 
unity realized that the time was not yet ripe for polit·ical 
federation. 56 The task of carrying on European integration 
56 Ugo la Malfa,"The Case for European Integration," ia 
c. Grove Haines (ed.J, op. cit., p.68. 
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fell to the small groups who had advocated the functional 
approach from the very beginning and had not closed their 
eyes to political reality. The proponents of functionali8111 
bad learned the lessons from the unification attempts of 
the past. Instead of looking toward international organi~ 
zation as a means for obtaining r.1ore effective common 
political institutions, the functionalists attempted to 
establish such a minimum of political institutions as mig~t 
be indispensable to direct the joint action that was most 
urgently requiredo The functio11alists l1oped to secure 
British if not Scandinavian cooperation. However, it soon 
became apparent that West European integration had to be 
restricted to the "Little Eurrope of tl1e Six 00 ivhere the 
Catholic parties, in power or in influential positiona, 
were willing to support limited supranational cooperation 
and were able to muster to this end sufficient govern11ental 
if 1not popular support. 
THe functionalists approaclied t11~ unification prob--
lea from two premises: first,. economic integration must 
precede political unification and would not be feasible 
unless certain basic economic sectors agreed on a common 
supranational policy; second, economic integration even at 
the re&ional level, would be impossible unless West Ger-
aany, ~"the heart lancll" of Western Eunrope were brought in)>? 
Agreeing basica.lly on the method of approach, the 
functionalists of "Little Europe" now looked for a pro-
57 Loewenstein, op. cit., p.89. 
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graa which could be reaDistic and acceptable, so that it 
could be sponsored governmentally, and as well serve as a 
first step toward further integration. 
The Dutch government first sponsored the so~called 
Mansbold Plan for the gradual adjustment and modernization 
) 
of West European agriculture on a supranational basis. 
The plan failed to gain general acceptance because of the 
strong opposition of the divisive national agricultural 
lobbies in all of "Little Europe," including Holland. 
The Pellis, Petsche and Stikker plans presented by 
tbe Italian, French and Dutch governments respectively, 
approached West European integration from the financial 
angle. The main idea of the financial plan was, with a 
few variants, the creation of a European investanent fund 
to finance large-scale West European public work~ as well 
as the industrialization of the underdeveloped European 
regions. The financial approach to ~uropean integration 
seemed to arouse considerable interest in political and _:. 
fina11cial circles, but it \Vas bound to fail because ot 
the scarcity, of available capital. 
However, all these pl~ns were eclipsed by the Scbu-
aan Plan actually prepared by Jean Monnet, which propojed 
the pooling_of all German and French coal and steel pro-
duction under the direct supervision of a supranational 
high authority and which invited direct participation by 
other West European states. 
None of the plans, including the Schuaan Plan, re-
" 
°"1, 
51 
presented an original idea. All of them bad been discussed 
during previous pro-Euuropea·n gatherrings, had been developed 
in considerable detail by the technocrats of the European 
Movement, and had been presented in outline to the West-
minster conference in April, 1949. 
The acceptance of the Schuman Plan and its success 
~ ~ 
as the first step toward integration was due to a happy 
coincidence of political and economic factors and to ex-
cellent timing. From the political standpoint the threat 
of the ~ommunist bloc, combined in French (and to a certain 
extent in Helgian and Dutch) minds with the spectre of a 
rising Germany, all worked in favor of the plan. France 
and Benelux hoped that its realization would strengthen 
the West European anti-Communist forces and help limit and 
neutralize possible future outbursts of German energy. 
From the economic standpoint coal and steel production in 
the public mind was always connected in the organization 
of international cartels. 58 The Schµman Plan promised that 
( , ' 
I - --, 
through·' suprallf.ltionair planning it w~uld be ~ossible to 
control the cartels and also to eliminate large-scale 
unemployment and economic depression. Arrivi11gL,\at a time 
when European politics seemed to be at an impasse 9 the 
r Schuman Plan represented a concrete step toward West 
European integration. 
58 .. , Kover, op. cit., p.318. 
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.,. 
The Schuman Plan offered to the pro-European group• 
of "Little Europe" a concrete, supranational program which 
they bad been seeking, but at the same time it led to an 
open split within the heterogeneous mem~ership of the 
Council of Europe. 
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CHAPTER II 
FROM THE SCHUMAN PLAN 
TO THE 
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY ·. -•.' 
The Political and Economic Motivations for the Schuman Plan 
On May 9, 1950, on the fifth anniversary of the end 
ot World War II, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schu-
man, announcing the plan which was to bear his name, said 
at a press conference: 
"The contribution which an organized and active Europe can make to civilization is indispensable for tl1e maintE:nance of peaceful relationsoFrance, by championing du.ring more than tiwenity yearrs the idea of a united Europe, has always rsgarded it 
as an essential objective to serve the purposes 
of peaceJ Because Europe was not united, we have l1ad tYair o 
A united Europe will not be achieved at onee, 
nor in a single framewerk: it will be formed by 
concrete measures ivhich at first create a soli-darity in facto The uniting of the European 
nations ~equi~es that the age~old opposition be-tween F:rartlc<e and Ge:rn1any be overcome~ tt1e action to be taken must? first of all 9 concern France and Germanyo 
To that end, the French government proposes that an immediate action be concentr&t~d on one limited but decisive pointo The French govern-
ment proposes that the entire Franco-German pro-duction of coal and steel be placed under a com-
mon and joint High Authority, within an organiza-tion open to participation by other nations.l 
In 1949 \Vestern J:t~urope,and especially France, faced 
aeveral urgent and interdependent problems demanding ilr.ime-
diate solutions: the political future of Germany; economic 
1 Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London: §oyaI fnstitute of International iffairs;t9~3)pp.315-18. 
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~ reeonstruction; supranational cooperation; and the future 
economic ... expansion of Wes tern Europe 4' The Schuman Plan 
seemed to promise at least a partial solution to these 
problems, if not for the ,:-1hole of ~Ve stern ~urope, at least 
for the hLittle Europe oK the Six." But the two main 
I 
hopes and purposes of the Schuman Plan were to put Franco-
German relations on a completely new basis, and thereafter 
to lead all of West European politics to a new realistic 
approach toward supranational cooperation. 
The plan itself was the i.result of very concrete poli-
tical considerations. Schuman and his collaborators who 
were responsible for the plan were clearly aware of the 
international weaknesses of the Fourth Republic and of the 
political structure of \Vestern Europe as ,vell. They knew ·· 
that Western gurope, in spite of the apparent success of 
its reconstruction, remained depe11dent on the continuous 
flow of American aid. They dlso realized the amorphous 
character of the idea of West European federation and 
particularly the intense emotional reaction to this idea 
in France, where both tlie. a1ationalist right and the ex--
treme left found it difficult to ac·cept a political union 
with the enemies of yesterday. 2 The only supranational 
cooperation for which it would be possible to enlist con-
siderable popula.n~ support in France ,would be with Britain; 
but partly because of Commonwealth consideration there was 
a Spinelli, op. cit., p.50. 
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cona tant opposition to this in England. 3 
While the political system of the Fourth Republic 
with its constant governmental changes prevented France 
-from~pursuing a consistent foreign policy, Schuman and 
bis collaborators watched with considerable uneasiness 
the modifications of Allied occupation policy in Germany 
and the rapid political and economic recovery of that 
country. The Schuman group realized that a certain amount 
of West European integration would be inevitable and 
thought it best to take a first concrete step before West 
European unification would be enforced by the mere fact 
of German hegemony. 
Even after they had decided to take the initiative, 
the mood of the Schuman group ,vas divided. The optimists 
saw in the Schuman Plan the beginning of a new era. They 
hoped that the West European economic partnership in coal 
·and steel under the direction of an international high 
authority would not only spur the growth of the national 
econo1uies but also lead to tl1e development of stroig econo-
aic interdependence which, together with supranational 
control of coal and steel, would make war impossible 
between France and Germany, and in \Vestern Europe as a 
wbole. 4 The3: pessiuiists considered that the Schuman Plan 
would guarantee France a few scraps from the meal of the 
,z~ 
,·,··- -'-"*'( 
3Thomas H. White, Fire in the Ashes (N.Y.:Sloane,1953),p.243. I 
, 4 Jean Monnet, Le~ Etats-Uni~ de l'Euro~e ont Commence, (Paris: R. Lallont, I~~Sj, pp.28-30. 
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Ger•an tiger -- certainly a better solution than to be a 
victim of the tiger's greediness. 5 
The acceptance of the Schuman Plan idea was moreover 
facilitated by the \Vest European economic situation. Since 
1949 the leading econ~mists had predicted the danger of an 
approaching recession, due mainly to the lack of coordina-
tion among the national industries in the area. The West ~ 
European steel industry, considerably modernized since the 
end of the war through local efforts and American aid, 
succeeded easily in surpassing prewar production levels, 
but, at the same time, suffered from the lack of interna-
tional coordination. The steel producers, on the initia-
tive of Dr. \Valter :~hwede, the old steel cartel veteran, 
had considered reviving the old international steel cartel 
agreement, but in the postwar era the idea of cartelliza-
tion had come under a double attack. Leftist propaganda 
continued its prewar attack on the cartels as "merchants 
of death," while the Americans criticized them as instru-
ments for curtailing competition, as obstacles to the 
creation of a free economy, and as the main barrier to the 
development of an affluent, open society. West European 
governments were no more favorablf disposed toward the 
cartels now than they had been before the war. They ob-
,·1• 
jected to the cartel policy of res~1ricted production, of 
5 Karl Loewenstein,"The Union of Western Europe -- Illu-
sion._::and Reality," Colt!.illbia Law Review ,LIi, (January-
February, 1952), p.BU. 
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"keeping t"e market going," because it usually resulted in 
heavy une1nployrnent. Nevertheless, the idea of ·a certain 
.. -
minimum of supranational control and a certain minimom of 
economic planning on the supranational level seemed to 
appeal to virtually all West European states struggling 
with the unemployment problem. It is hard to say to what 
extent the predictions of the West European experts about 
an approaching depression in 1949 v1ere tvellCCl~founded; but 
they certain1y helped indirectly to create an atmosphere 
favorable to supranational cooperation. 
Reaction to the Schuman Plan 
Schuman's proposal caught the world by surprise. 6 
But in spite of the dramatic nature of the initial an-
nouncement, the reception of the Schuman Plan, though 
favorable, was far from as enthusiastic as its :imftiators 
officially announced. Public opinion in the \Vest wel-
comed this French initiative as a noble gesture toward 
the former enemy, but thoroughly ignored the plan's 
technical implicatio11s, whose magnitude and complexity 
were understood only by a relatively small circle of 
specialists. At the time, not even all men in leading 
poaitions grasped both the political and economic signi-
ficance of the proposal. 7 -
6 
7 
,/ 
The Economist, CLII, June 10, 1950. 
Loewenstein, 0 op. cit., p.90. 
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The American government welcomed the Schuman Plan. 
Dean Acheson, on the day after its a1mouncement, viewed 
it "with sympathy and approval,"8 and President Truman, at 
his press conference on May 18, 1950, praised the Schuman 
initiative as r3an act of constructive s tatmsn1a.nship" wlnich 
: 
"provides the basis for establishing an entirely new re-
lationship between France and Germany and opens a new out-
look for Europe."9 I ~···.,_,,_.'\ .• ••~·.•,I ' ~ .:W.'• • ' •) 
American policy,which earlier bad played an impartant 
part in bringing together European and German affairs, now 
gave its full support to the Schuman policy. In the comiqr; 
negotiations the American influence was to play an impor-
tant role and helped to overcome quite a fe\n1 t11reatening 
deadlocks. 10 But, even if American support alone did not 
guarantee the final success of the treaty, it still repre-
sented a substantial contributiono Schuman's proposals 
were favorably received not only by American business 
circles agreeable to tbe idea of a big common market, but 
also by the labor unions. The Executive Coran1i ttee of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations went so far as to 
give to the Schuman Plan its of£icial support. 
The reaction of French public opinion was mostly 
favorable, although rather reserved and somehow sceptical. 
The favorable surprise effect of the Schuman declaration 
'' 
8 
9 
New York Times, 
Ibid a / 1 
lO New Yor"k_/TiMea, 
May 11, 1950. 
June 18, 1950. 
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lasted for quite a long ti•e, but the plan was 1000 op-
posed by an ad hoc coalition of tbe extreme right and the 
left. Communist opposition was to be expected, particular-
ly when Pravda decllarred tl1e Schuman Plan to be the "inter-
governmental 01rga.rmi2ation of a giant cartel, proposed by 
the West European governments in bondage to the United 
Stat'es, and developed under the pressure of American 
bankers~ 11 
Surprisingly enough, the opposition of the right was 
unexpectedly strong. De Gaulle, who only a few weeks 
earlier called Adenauer a "good German and hailed the pro-
posed Franco-German union as an idea worthy of Cl1arlemagne," 
now turned with the same passion against the Schuman Plan, 
regarding it as "a useless wish-mash(!!!! meli~melo combinat 
guelcongue) scheme. n12 The Rassemblement du Peuple !FrlID-
c;ais follo~;ed its leader and its "ideologistn, ru1d Secre-
tary General Gaston Palewski criticized the government for 
orga~izing first a uritish-led military phantom in the 
Pact of B~ussels, and now for helping to build up a real 
0 
ll 3 Geraan industrial hegemony under a European cove~o-
The leaders of heavy industry - lfbo, ···m:e1c:11tn~ meat ,part, 
were uninformed and not consulted in advance, reacted with 
polite stupifaction. In general, the representatives of 
11 Le Monde, May 12, 1950. 
-12 
Ibido 9 ~iay 28 1950. . (i) $#!::> 
13 Ibid., May 24, 1950. 
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Prencb industry agreed with the plan and even with the 
idea of eventual cooperation with German firms, but they 
were uneasy about the vague po,vera of the High Autl1ority, 
which they considered, in spite of its supranational 
character, more dangerous than direct state intervention.14 
The French steel industry was particularly afraid of Ger-
man competition. Even if France in 1949-50 had approximat.-
ly the same steel output as Germany, French production was 
quantity-oriented while German steel was superior in 
quality. The French feared German competition not so much 
because of the better German equipment or organization, as 
France bad improved considerably since 1945, but mainly 
because of low German wages and the less inclusive German 
social legislation. 15 
The French labor unions were generally opposed to 
the Schuman Plan. The Communist-led Confederation Gen-
erale du Travail denowiced it as an American-inspired 
policy leading to a further weakening of li'rench political 
and economic independence and to mass unemploymento 16 The 
' C .Go To Force Ouvriere took a more 1noderate view. It was 
willing to support the Schuman Plan, but only on two 
conditions: 1) close cooperation with the Labor govern-
ment of Britain and 2) strict control and limitation ot 
14 
15 
16 
Le Monde, May 23, 1950. 
Ibido 9 Pfiay 12? 1950. rm-===~ 
Ibido, May 29, 1950. 
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the private economy. 
L 
, , The Confederation Francaise dea 
Travailleure Chr'etiens, the Catholic trade unions, ap-
proved the Schuman Plan with some hesitation and called 
for close cooperation with the labor groups of the future 
participating states, especially with German labor unions.17 
Even though French non-communist labor finally accepted 
the Schuman plan n in principle," its ranl~ and file never 
overcame a certain distrust, particularly toward the High 
Authority which they regarded as an organ of an internatiOlllll 
supertrust. They were afraid also of losing the advantages 
of social benefits and of a living standard superior to 
that of Germany. The French workers saw in the Schuman 
Plan not a conception of management, but only a super-
organization of capitalists waging an international class 
war against a proletariat"wbich was organized only on a 
nation~state basis. 
The German government was very favorably inclined 
to the Schuman Plan. Chancellor Adenauer approved it 
immediately after its announcernent and the Bonn govern-
ment accepted it ''without reservations" on &4ay 16, 1950, 
and set up a commission of experts to examine the plan 
in detail. Adenauer's German postwar policy had two 
main objectives: the reunificetioinl of the country and the 
restoration of full sovereignty.18 
17 
18 
Ibid., May 17, 1950, 
Black and Thoapson, op. cit., p.154. 
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The first objective depended on the future development 
of East~West relations. As for the second, the Schuman 
Plan offered Germany the considerable political advantages 
of being accepted as an equal and sovereign state of the 
Western community. 
Tl1e 011ly serious West German opposition to the Schu-
man Plan at this period came from the leadership of the 
Social Democratic party who, soon after VVorld \Var II rea-
lized that in a largely Catholic West Germany the Social 
Democrats would in all probability always run a poor se-
cond. The Socialists saw in the unification of \Vest 
Germany with the Hussian-occupied East zone, the tradi-
tionally Socialist part of the country, the only hope for 
improvement in their situation. As a result, the Social 
Democrats rejected the uncompromising pro-ifes tern policy 
of Adenauer, pointing out that the close attachment of 
West Germany to the Western camp could only result in a 
perpetual di vision of Germar1y. The Schuman Plan, according 
to the Social Democrats, would virtually institutionalize 
such a division, incorporating West Germany first in the 
West European bloc a11d then in the Viestern alliance. 
The Socialists saw in the Schuman 1~1an an attempt to build 
up an international cartel which would indefinitely post-
pone the old dream of German Socialism, the nationaliza-
tion of heavy industry. The German Socialists, lilce their 
,French colleagues,hoped that the British Labor government 
would participate in the plan and that British socialist 
influence would act as a brake on the strong free market ""-· \ 
63 
tendencies of the other West European participating states. 
German business and industry welcomed the Schuman 
Plan as an uneapected opportunity to be freed from the 
then remaining Allied economic controls and production 
,. 
restrictions. Hut in spite of all official assurances, 
German business feared that the High Authority would come 
to take the place of Allied control. Though this un-
founded fear did not last long, a strong feeling remained 
in Gerrnan business circles thEit Germany ivas paying the 
highest wprice for union" of the six participating 
countries. 19 
The Benelux cowitries were very sceptical toward 
the Schurna.n proposal, but once France anti Germany agreed 
the three small countries had little choice but to accept, 
because they could hardly afford to stand apart. Each 
of the three felt itself to be a loser, and all three, 
even if they did not oppose the pr9ject, uid their best 
to limit it and were particularly opposed to the vast 
powers of the High Authority. 
The Dut,c-h·, who through an austerity program:. bad 
rebuilt and enlarged their coal and steel production, 
recognized the constructive elements of the Schuman Plan, 
and especiall_y the idea of the future common market; but 
they felt that they could participate in the negotihtion~ 
only if they could reserve their decision about eventual 
19 Le Monde, June 9, 1950. 
.. 
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future participation. 
The Belgians approached the Schuman Plan with even 
aore scepticism than the Dutch, but like the Dutch they 
could not very well keep aloof from the proposed coal and 
steel pool. In 1950 the Belgians tvere a rich countrc·y 
among poor neighbors. Relatively, the war had spared the 
mother country, while the Belgian Congo, then a peaceful 
model colony with huge uranium and copper deposits, brou@Jlt 
Belgium an unprecedented prosperity. With the exception 
of Switzerland, Helgium was the only European country that 
did not suffer from a dollar shortage. Though prosperity 
bad brought with it certain inflationary tendencies, the 
Belgians, even with ~igber production costs, enjoyed a 
far higher standard of living than their neighbors. . .... 
The virtual exhaustion of her coal mines further 
complicated Helgium•s position on the Schuman proposals. 
The Belgian coal producers were very strongly opposed to 
the Schuman Plan, particularly to the proposed powers of 
the High Authority to intervene in the operation of their 
aines. The stee !-makers, on the ··.:o·the,; band, cooperating 
closely with the steel-makers of Luxemburg, both exporting 
the major part of their output, welcomed the plan. Though 
Belgian and Luxemburg production costs were higher than 
those of France and Germa11y, the higl1 quality of their 
steel had assured then1 oi" a steady market in the past. 
The Schuman Plan was well received by the Italians, 
who were convinced th<at· they liad ev-~thing to gain and 
nothing to lose, politically as well as economically. Tbe 
, .. ·· · - r: ---.-~-.,-- :'c·--...-- -, ,:·,-,--___ ,...._..._. - ... . ·111111111 
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Schuman Plan offered the Italians full membership in the 
Atlru1tic conirnuni ty and access to raw materials, invest-
ments, and credits. Last, but not least, the free move-
ment of labor envisaged by the plan would solve Italy's 
chronic unemployment problem, one of the most difficult 
in Europe. 
The unwillingness of the Labor government in London 
to participate in the plan gave its sponsors a severe 
jolt, especially since the scheme seemed to correspond 
to the British copception of the functional approach. 
The British raised strong objections, not so much 
against the basic idea of the Schuman Pl an as against 
its proposed implementation. The Hritish government did 
not want to be bou11d to the principle of pooling coal and 
steel production before the negotiations could rev.ea! 
what that really meant. The British and French also 
disagreed over the nature of the High Authority. The 
British considered unacceptable the transfer of sovereign 
rights to "an international body of undecided cou1posi-t~ion 
and "uneluc.idated prir1ciples, virtually responsible to 
. 20 
nobody o" The Labor government also pointed out that 
as a socialist government it was not prepared to surrender 
its sovereign rights over production and employment policy 
to an unspecified authority. In a pamphlet entitled 
European Unitl the Labor party expressed its real attitude 
20 Economist, June 10, 1950, pp.1257-61. 
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bf rejecting all possibility of closer cooperatiori,lritb 
continental Europe "now as well as in the future," 
pointing out that Britain's ties 11ltitl1 Australia or New 
~ealand werre closer than those with the European continent.21 
On Ma.y 30, 1950, after an exchange of notes and 
aeaoranda between London and Paris,the French finally 
dropped their demand for unconditional adherence to the 
principles of the Schuman Plan. Hut it was too late. On 
.June 13, 1950, Prime "\finister Attlee announced in the 
House of Commons the tsritish refusal to join the Schuman 
Plan or even to participate in the negotiationso The 
British government, however, while adamantly opposed to 
direct participation in the Schuman project, outwardly 
maintained a "correct position." It said nothing unfriend-
ly about the Schuman Plan id~ and refrained from using 
., 
its influence as an occupying/ power to block German accep-
tance of the coal and steel pool~ Though the Conservativ•, 
and to some extent the Liberals, criticized the Labor 
govern111ent 's dealings ivith tl1e French and the ,vau in which 
tbe Schuman Plan had been bluntly rejected, there was no 
important body of opinion in the country which urged that 
Britain take the road leading toward extensive economic 
•' 
an.d poli t __ j.cal supranational integration; on this point 
there was full inter-party consensus. 23 
21 
22 
, 'c 
L'Annee, Politigue, 1950, p.103. 
\Villi am Diebold, The Schuo1an Plan (New York: Praeger, 
1959), 1)0590 
Le Monde, June 4, 1950. 
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The Scandinavian states, influenced by neutral 
S•eden, declined the Frencl1 invitation to participate in 
the Scbuagan Plan. The S'\edes were not so much concerned 
\ 
',, 
with the economic features '·of the,, plan as they were with 
the .sivedisn llOlicy of neutrality. Tbe Sivedles offlro:ad their 
Scandinavian neighbors closer political and economic 
coopeaation on a regional basis within the Nordic Council 
to con1pensate for 11ossible disadvantages arising from 
their remaining outside the proposed coal and steel pool. 
The Difficult Beginnings 
The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty came 
into force on July 25, 1952, on which date a conference 
of foreign ministers of the participating states met in 
Paris to decide the official languages of the Authority, 
lbe selection of the members of the High Authority and 
of the Gourt, and the seat for the ~ommunity headquarters. 
The conference, initially, ran into conside1'9able diffi-
culties. 24 The ministers, however, determined that the 
working languages of the ~ommunity should by French, 
German, Italian, and Dutch, with court proceedings to be 
carried on in the language of the parties' choice. 
The dif f ic·ul t beginnings concerned the appointment 
of the High Authority members. But under Belgian and 
Dutch pressure the 1ninisters had to modify the already 
24 ' .• Diebold, op. cit., p.110. 
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ratified Treaty and create a second vice-presidency in 
the High Authority. However, the most difficuit part of 
<, 
the negotiation was over the seat of the Community's 
institutions. The Belgian Prime Minister, Paul van ~e-
land,proposed to place the RCSC headquarters in Liege, 
as ht.· had promised to tl1e tiJalloon politicians in return 
for their support of the ratification of the Schuman Plan. 
Hls proposal was rejected as the other delegates in turn 
proposed a city in their own countries. 
Schwnan proposed to place the Community seat in 
Saarbruken, where it would be near Strasbourg and where 
it would represent the first step toward "Europeanization" 
of the Saar region. The propose.ti was supported by the 
Italian Pr:tme r~in.i8ter Alcide de Gasperi'> but was badly 
received by the Ger1nan delegation. Adenauer ,vas particu-
larly suspicious that France intended the ECSC and the 
"Europeanization" of the Saar region to be a means of 
alienating the Saar from Germany. The resulting Franco-
German discussion over the Saar tr1reatened to i,reck the 
conference and postpone the realization of the ECSC. 
After a protracted debate, the delegates accepted the 
compromise proposal of de Gasperi, placing the seat of the 
High Autbori ty and the Court temporarily in lLUJ{en1burg 
City, while the Community Assembly, at least fo~ its 
f,irsi sitting, would be held in Strasbourg. Where the 
permanent se~t of the ECSC would be was made dependent 
upon a future French-German agreeu1ent on the Saar 
I • 
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region. 25 At the final meeting, de Gasperi and Schuman 
proposed that the community Assembly, which was to meet 
on September 10, 1952, should prepare a project for a 
federal union of ~Little ~urope" under a single political 
authority. The proposal gained some support from Adenauer, 
but the J:Selgians and the Dutch opposed it, and the MinistEn 
decided to discuss the project some time in the future. 
After the July ~onference in Paris the six govern-
ments woked toward agreement on appointments to the High 
Authority, and on August 7, 1952, Schuman announced its 
composition. As expected, Jean Monnet became the High 
Authority chairman. Franz Etzel, a lawyer and economist, 
became the First Deputy-Chairman, and Albert Coppee, 
Helgian economist, the Second Chairman. The Belgian and 
Dutch da11andt that the second presidency be reserved to .a 1 
Belgian or Dutch national was evidence of their anxiety 
to achieve institutional guarantees agai11st undue French 
and German predominance. Both the Belgians and the Dutch 
at the beginning of the ECSC distrusted de Gasperi's and 
Schuman's proposal for a closer political federation. 
They also questioned how the ECSC intergovernmental rela-
tionships would work out in view of the political and 
economic predominance of France and Germany. Acting 
together, France and Germany could decide the political 
course, and a serious disagreement between the• could 
25 ~ Monde, July 28, 1952. 
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bring tbe ~01111unity to a stand~still. The checking of the 
Franco-German predominance within the Community continued 
to pose problems but the agreement on the ·Higll Authority 
aeabership made this question less acute • 
. , . 
The Community faced another uneasy problem, that of 
setting up its institutions. The High Authority held its 
first session in Luxemburg ~ity on August 10, 1952, on 
which occasion Jean Monnet stressed that the ECSC was 
intended to be one of the main instruments of West European 
unification and consequently its policy had to be evolved 
within a context of more than just the coal and steel 
sector. He assured the European public that the Community 
institutions and especially the H~gh Authority would not 
usurp the rights of individual enterprises, but would 
use their powers only to create the most favorable condi-
tions for the best development of a free economy within 
the Community. Monnet underlined tl1e magnitude o1" the 
High Authority's tasks and difficulties, which could be 
overcome only by a close cooperation between the High 
26 Authority and the member governraents. 
Ji '-~ ... •!• ., ,, ' 
The Council of I\1inisters eventually endorsed the 
French-Italian proposition that the Community Assembly 
should be charged with the project of transforming the 
ECSC into•a political federation. This was also supported 
by the German delegation. The proposed project of poli-
26 lilli&11 Diebold, op~ cit., pp.96-98. 
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tical federalization or the ECSC was opposed by the 
Belgian and Dutch delegations on the legal ground that 
neither the Council of Ministers nor the Common Assembly 
can overstep the limits of the ECSC Treaty without 
., 
authorization of the national parliaments. 
Tl1e Common Assembly posed considera'bll difficulties 
for the High Authority and the Council of I\finisters. 
According to the ECSC Treaty, theAsseitD13 was an advisory 
body whose main duty was to discuss, at the end of the 
year, the Report of the High Authority. If the Report 
was disapproved, it would cause the collective resignation 
of the High Authority. Hut neither the Assembly's advi-
sory capacity nor its relationship to the High Authority 
or to the ~ouncil of rvlinisters li'lere properly stated. When 
the Assembly met for the first time in Strasbourg on 
September 10, 1952, no High Authority report was ready, 
and it was not clear what would be its role within the 
Community. 
The Assembly opened with a speech by its oldest 
aember, the 1talian senator Boggiano Pico, who stressed 
that the main role of the Assembly was to work toward 
27 this ultimate goal, The following day the Assembly 
elected 1.YPaill-Henri Spaak as its first chairman. The 
election wae followed by Monnet's address in which be 
pointed out that the ~ommunity Assembly was the first 
European supranational parliament with~.power of decision 
27 Le Monde, September 12, 1952 • 
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and sovereign within the limits specified by the ECSC. 
Treaty. He underlined that responsibility for the 
application of the ECSC Treaty was shared by the Assembly 
and the High Authority. i:sut while presenting the High 
Authority me,nbers as serva11ts of the t.;ouimuni ty' s inst i-
t t . 28 b d ·t l th t th . t f th u ions, e ma e 1 c ear a e impor ance o e 
High Authority, as the poAicy-making organ, exceeded that 
ot the Assembly. 
Adenauer, speaking after Monnet, compared the 
Council of Ministers to a parliamenta~y Upper Chamber, 
whose role called for their representing the particular 
interests of the member states, while the Assembly was to 
represent the dynamic federal spirit of the Community as 
a whole. He asked the Assembly to start working without 
delay on a statute to replace the present ECSC by a 
political federation. 29 The Assembly members resented 
and sharply criticized Monnet•s views with respect to the 
preponderance of the High Authority technocrats over the 
Cornrnuni ty Assembly, and even niore Adenauer• s attempt to 
present the Council of Ministers as a supranational 
Upper t;l1amber. 
The ECSC parliamentarians considered the Assembly 
a supranational parliament of the ~ommunity, even if the 
majority of them did not share the views of the federalists 
28 
29 
Ibid., Septeaber 13, 1952. 
Ibid. 
.. _,,,... _,_ --~-"~"4'tJI. WIJS 4t..;;~:,.i,-,-.,.- ,-~ -: 
• .i~L'Jiii-:' :;:::,_ ~ ~-;.: 
73 
that the European federalization must be achieved "now 
or never." They believed ti1at the Assenibly should play. 
a more important~role than to approve once a year, ex 
post facto, the High Authority's annual report and were 
critical of the concept of the Assembly itseI1: But the 
Assembly was without leadership, without party organiza-
tion, and without any precise idea about the policy 
..... 
formulation on the supranational level. Many of its 
,.1 
seventy-eight parliamentarians were meeting each other f<r 
the first time. The only somewhat organized supranational 
faction were the federalists. But because of their vague 
program and a certain ingenuousness in their approach to 
the political problems of the ~CSC, the rest of the Assem~ 
bly members did not take them very seriously. The dis-
united Assembly could criticize toe views of the High 
Authority and of the Council of Ministers, but it was only 
a negative criticismo Its members could make claim to the 
supremacy of the Assembly on the supranational level of 
the ECSC as well as on the na~ional scene, but were unable 
to formulate its own policy. 
After some debate the parliamentdians accepted 
Adenauer's proposal, made on behalf of the council of 
. 
Ministers, and voted a resolution in which they not only 
pledged to study with all attention the federalization 
project, but congratulated the ministers for taking a 
. 
constrt1ctive initiative pointing the way toward West 
European Unity. 
t. ,'i .•• ,,.,' ~ • ...--
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On September 15, 19~2, the Common Assembly declared 
\ 
itself a constitutive Ad Hoc Assembly with a special charge 
---
to prepare, by March, 1953, a draft of a treaty which would 
replace the ECSC by a political federation, and finally 
,, 
elected a twenty~six member constitutional Commission with 
instructions to prepare a draft of the proposed federation 
treaty, and then adjourned. 
The High Autboritl: Supranational Planning Board 
The planners of the ECSC considered it to be the 
first federal institution and the High Authority as its 
fulcrum and nucleus for the future executive branch of a 
European federal government. In their view the High 
Authority had to represent a stable and permanent execu-
tive, truly supranational in spirit, and it was expected 
that the first loyalties of the High Authority members 
would be primarily to European unity. The High Authority, 
acting ip the name of the whole ECSC; was, according to 
Jean ~4onnet, superior in importance to the Council of 
Ministers. The members of the Council~ acting only as 
political agents of the national governm~nts, in Monnet'& 
and the federalists 0 view, lacked tJEurropean 13 legitimation.30 
The High Authority, in order to perform its function, was 
to act as an independent executive with as little outside 
interference as possible. The administrative stature 
30 Ernest 8. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: 
Stanford Universiiy Press, 1~8J, p.455. 
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ol the High Authority was drafted by Monnet and his close 
collaborators, Andre Hirsch and Pierre Uri. They used as 
. 
~-
a model for the High Autbor_j-ty tq.e organizational pattern 
of the French Secretariat of Reconstruction. 31 
The High Authority administration consists of twelve 
operating divisions, each division reflecting the policy 
ot the High Authority, and underlining the conception of 
the ECSC that their task is limited to the application of 
the Treaty and not to the direct supervision of the coal 
and steel industry. 32 Originally, there were eleven 
operating divisions: -(1) finance,(2) investment,(3) pro-
duction,(4) rnarket,(5) agreement· and concentrations,(6) 
labor,(7) transport,(8) economics,(9) administration, 
(lO)statistics, ( 11) legal questions. 'fo these operating 
divisions was added, in 1954, a new twelfth division of 
external affairs. The heads of the operating divisions 
are permanent executive officers supervising the staff 
personnel and re1ponsible directly to the High Authority. 
In order to coordinate the highly specialized but 
often overlapping worl, of the operating divisions, the 
High Authority created, in 1954, six vo\ltJorking groups"; 
(1) the 1narket group, (2) the group of investments ,finance 
and production,(3) labor,(4) foreign relations,(5)general 
econoraic objectives i and (6) the administr~tiorm grroup. 
Each group· operates under the direction of two 9 tn1rree 
or more (depending on the importance of its work) High 
31 Ibid., Po 456. 
32 Merry ,Kio JT o 9 °The ~uropean t.;oai. and Steel Community -
Operations of· the High Authority," The Western Political 
guarterlf, VIII (Junly, 1955), p.18S.-
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Authority members who elect their group-chairaan. The 
High Authority as a collegiate body aakes its decisions 
collectively. The deliberations of its members are secret. 
The High Authority members prefer to reach final decisions 
by a negotiated consensus and resort to ~alloting only 
when all negotiation attempts fail. 
Before the High Authority makes its final decision, 
the matter is studied by the respective operating divisions 
and there thoroughly discussed among the permanent staff 
speaialists and one or two High Authority members. Then 
the problem is further discussed in the working group"among 
the, senior permanent officers, the High Authority members 
forming the working group. At this stage the complicated 
technical or administrative problems are quite often dis-
cussed with invited experts, individuals or a group of 
specialists who volunteer their advisory services. Though 
the majority of the High Authority members have a consider~ 
able knowledge of the ECSC problems and the permanent staff 
of specialists worlcing \Vi tl1 them represents, on the ivt1ole, 
the elite of the West European universities and technical 
32 schools, the High Authority depends for advisory ser-. 
vices on outside experts, particularly in the fields of 
aarketing, transport, labor statistics, production and 
financial policy. 33 
32 
33 
... 
Jean Monnet's conception of tbe High Authority as the 
Merry, op. cit., p.·170. 
Ibid. 
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chief administrative and political instrument of supra-
national co,per-ation did not work as expected. The High 
Authority administrators, including Monnet himself, did 
not build up popular support for the idea of Eruuropean 
unity any more than other pro._Europesum groups l1ad done. 
Within the framework ·or the ECSC, suspicion, fear, and 
open opposition toward the High Authority developed on the 
part of some governinents, politicians and interest groups. 
The opposition succeeded in forcing Monnet's resignation 
and in reducing the supranational powers of the High 
Authority. But the High Authority laid do,m a permanent 
basis for a supranational public service, which may well 
remain on the European scene as a part of its modern 
technical civilization. 
The Council of Ministers: ~u2ranational Cooperation!!!: 
National Interests? 
In the strict terms of the Treaty, the Council of 
Ministers is on an equal standing with the High Authority. 
As the organ most sensitive to the 11ati':)Q~l pressures, 
its main role is to harmonize the national interests of 
the six governments with a policy of supranational inte-
gration. Since the beginning of the ECSC operation,tbe 
the Council's importance rapidly increased and it soon 
became the suprerae dee is i on-mah:ing organ of the Comn1uni ty. 
In dealing with the normal business questions of the Com-
munity, the Council is composed of the ministers of 
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economic affairs or their deputies. But when labor 
problems are under discussion the Council is enlarged by 
the ministers of social affairs. In very important 
•atters ·concernil)g the whole Community policy, particu-
larly where political questions are involved, the Council'~ 
membership is composed of the ministers of foreign affairs 
or the prime ministers. 34 The meetings of the Council 
are secret and only summary statements of its decisions 
are issued. 
The main function of the Council of Ministers is to 
work out by compromise a co~mon ECSC policy acceptable to 
all member states. Since 1954 it has become a customary 
procedure that the High Authority consults the Council of 
Ministers on every major decision. In purely technical 
matters and in cases requirUJ.g the initiative of the High 
Authority and the subsequent consent of the Council of 
Ministers, the High Authority made known its preferences, 
but awaited decisions of the Council of Ministers. In 
cases where the initiative was reserved for the Council 
but necessitated the cooperation of the High Authority, 
the decision remained entirely in the hands of the Council. 
All decisions concerning the ECSC relations with other 
countries, free movement of labor, coordination of the 
ECSC transpo:rc~tation policy, and labor and econornic policy 
has, since 1954, specifically been reserved to the Council 
Haas, op~ cit., p.488. 
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,. 
ot Ministera. 35 
The ministers on the Council, being representatives 
of the national governments, are primarily guardians of 
the interests of the 11ation-states. In the views of many ,, 
of the ministers, the political reality 
the nation-state, and therefor European 
primarily the matter of the governments 
of tod•y is 
integration 
reprresermted 
~ 
still 
• l.S 
by 
the Council of ~i1inisters rather than by the Comn1on Assembly 
or the High Authority. Particularly the political con-
ceptions of three prominent members of the Council of 
Ministers, Henri Ulver, ,.1ichel Rasquin, ah<l Lud\ivig Erhard, 
influenced not onlt'the ECSC but also the future of the 
European integration36 Henri Ulver, French minister of 
economy, formulated in November, 1954, the so-called 
Ulver doctrine stating that as every ECSC member state 
is sovereign in matters of economic policy, only the 
Council of Ministers can negotiate with foreign govern-
ments on behalf of tl1e Community. Michel Rasquin, 
Luxemburg 9 s minister of economic affairs, stated that 
aiembers of the Cou11cil of ~,tinisters are not responsible 
to the Common Assembly because the national parliaments 
and not the Common Assembly select the Council of ~'i·1i11isters. 
The Counc_il, not being responsible to the Common Assembly, 
- 37 could not be subject to its parliamentary control. 
35 
36 
37 
Ibid. 9 p.498. 
~ Monde, November 24, 1954. 
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Dr. Ludwig Erhard supported a purely functionalist approach 
to European cooperation, limited to economic affairs only. 
The ECSC, in his view, serves neither the economic nor 
the political aim of Germanyo 38 
J:·-i ••• • ' The Council of ministers is one of the most contro-
versial supranational institutions, and has been under 
repeated attack by European federalists, who compared it 
derogatorily to the "Nocturnal \;Ouncil" in Plato Os Laws. 3 9 
The ministers of the Council are responsible to their 
national parliaments, but even when controlling the whole 
ECSC operations, they are collectively responsible to 
40 
nobody~ The federalists on every occasion accuse the 
council of Ministers of being the main obstacle to a 
federal, united Europe. The functionalists and tecno-
crats reproached the politicians of the Council of Mini-
sters, saying that through their political inconsistencies, 
they have undermined even the modest results of the func-
tionalist approach to unity. 
The Common Assembly: The Hop~ for the Future 
The Comirnon Assembly, in ti11e terrne of the ECSC 
Treaty, has only token powers to approve or disapprove tbe 
annual reports of the High Authority. If the Assembly is 
dissatisfied with the work done, it can vote a motion ot 
38 
39 
40 
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censure against the High Authority. This in turn result• 
in the latter's collective resignation. The drafters of 
· the ECSC Treaty intentionally made the Assembly weak, 
without legislative powers, vJi thout the power of the 
purse, and without a possibility to exercise a constant 
parliamentary control over ECSC operations. In the tra-
dition of the French bureaucracy they were hostile to the 
interference of the parlian1entarrians, and in the case of 
the ECSC, they tried to avoid creating a supranational 
parliamentary institution, which could easily turn into 
a debating club like the Council of Europe. 
The ·first sessions of the ~ommo~ Assembly were 
disappointing for parliamentarians and the High Authority 
members alike. Jean Monnet and his colleagues did not 
conceal the feeling that the Common Assembly deputies 
would be of little use for the High Authority's highly 
technical work, and the parliamentarians were determine& 
to make of the Common Assembly a true supranational par-
liament.41 The deputies of the Common Assembly, although 
divided in their political views, agreed that the annual 
control of the High Authority, conferred upon the Assembly 
by the Treaty, did not correspond to the mission of the 
ECSC parliament. They wanted to follow the actions of 
the High Autl1ori ty not only frrom endc=of-year reports 0£ 
the past but in current detail. They wanted to discus• 
41 Ibid., p.391. 
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I ECSC budget estimates and to be informed on all ECSC 
.Ii :, 
projects as tvell as on matters of general policy.-..:~ 
The deputies also insisted on the right of interpellation 
by posing written and oral questions to the High Authority 
•embers, whose presence was to be required at all Assembly 
aeetings. In the spring of 1953, pern1anent parliamentary 
commissions were created, parallel to the eleven High 
Authority divisions. These commissions regularly follow 
I 
the work of the High Authority and the ECSC as a whole. 
The position of the common Assembly within the 
ECSC progressively improved. In March, 1953, the Asseably 
discussed the budget estimates of the High Authority and 
in 1954 it discussed the budget estimates of all ECSC 
institutionso Since 1956, the ECSC budget had been pre-
pared by the ~CSC Commission of Four Chairmen together 
with the Assembly's auditing and administrative commissions. 
The Common Assembly had progressively established a partial 
parliamentary control over the activities of the E~SC. 
Its permanent commissions took an active part in the work 
on_problems of transport, rehabilitation of the coal and 
steel workers, free movement of labor, coordination of 
social policy, and the investment policy, often investi-
gating the problems on the spot. 
The Common Assembly deputies succeeded in imposing 
a considerable parliamentary control over the High Authority. 
But all their attempts to cont~ol the Couneil of Ministers, 
where the real political power lies, have failed. The 
Council of Ministers rdgorously opposed all attempts of 
\ 
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tbe Coamon Assembly to interfere with its work and refused 
to submit reports of its activities, or even to agree to 
establish regular official contacts between the Council 
and the Assembly. 42 Some ministers voluntarily consented 
' . 
to attend the (;Orn:unon Assembly meetings, to a1lpea.r before 
its permane11t commissions, answer questions and partici-
pate in de~ates; but in general the ministers restri~t 
their official contacts with the Assembly to occasional 
receptions of deputies. 
The main reason for the common Assembly's weakness 
and also for its relative lame of efficiency is its inter-
nal organization. The governments and the national par-
liaments took particular:care to send to the Common 
Assembly politically approved parliamentarians who, while 
being "good Europeans," would not create complications 
by their pan-European zeal or political radicalism. A 
tacit agreement between the ECSC governments excluded 
Comn1u11ists and extreme nationalists, who might misuse 
the Strasbourg tribune to speak over the heads of the 
national governments. The Treaty fixed the number of 
representatives from each ECSC country and left the pro-
cedure of their selection to the discretion of every 
member state. No provision was made to fix, even tenta-
tively, the length of the deputies' term. 43 The procedures 
42 
43 
Haas, op. cit., pp.399. 
Haas, Ibid., p.407. 
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vary fro• country to country. 
The German and the Henelux countries' deputies re-
main in the .Ct~neral Assembly as long as tl1ey hold their 
seat at home and do not specifically resign. The French 
and Italian delegations change almost every year. The 
Italian delegation is supposed to be divided equally 
between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, but in the 
years 1955-1957, only the delegates of the Senate could 
be sent as representatives of the Common Assembly. This 
was due to the fact that in the Italian chamber, year aftA:r 
year ,a. -coalition of Commu11ists, 11eo-Fascists, and Socia-
lists successfully blocked the election of Common Assembly 
deputies. 44 The selection of the deputies by the national 
parliaments and the exclusion of all opposition give to 
the Common Assembly a certain artificial atipearance. There 
is little contact between the Common Assembly anu the na-
tional parliaments, the latter's role being largely limited 
to the election of the deputies and occasional debates 
about ECSC activities. 45 
The Common Asse,~bly members&jp is politically divided 
/,' 
across the national lines in threeloosely organized groups: 
The Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Socialists; 
the unattached Independents counting only a few members. 
The Christian Democrats are the strongest, relatively well 
44 
45 
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organized and a rather coherent group. Coamon catholic 
bonds help to bridge many differences ot a social and 
national nature. They occasional l.y cri tici~e il1e American 
"•aterialism of the machines," but they are perfectly 
reconciled with Monnet's technocratic views, including 
' planning~ The Christian Democrats are fully committed to 
the European federal program, but their conception of a 
federated Europe gives preference to the predominately 
Catholic and politically conservative "Little Europe" 
of the Six, and would include, under more favorable 
circumstances, eventually Austria and Spain. The emphasis 
on Roman Catholic "universalism" helped the Christian 
Democrats- to create relatively strong ties between the 
ECSC Catholic parties, but tended to isolate them f~o• 
the rest of Europe. 46 
The Liberal group is very loosely organized and 
relatively inactive. The European liberalism was for 
decades too closely tied to the vested interests of the 
nation-state and the national economies to emerge suddenly 
as a dynamic supranational force. The Liberal group 
represents in its majority the old, and rather less dyna~ 
aic, upperr-middle class stratu,n of the European society. 
In their majority they favor a moderate economic inte-
gration and close economic cooperation with Great Britaia 
) 
and with the Scandinavian countries. 
46 Ibid. .....~.,,.' .• '.-.. ·.;'. 
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The Socialist group, successfully overcoming the 
initial national quarrels, became the most col121rent group 
of the Common Assembly. The Socialists are strongly in 
favor of supranational coope·ration, but they do not con-
ceal their preference .for a close cooperation 1r1ith Great 
Britain and with the Scandinavian countries. Within the 
ECSC the Socialist group favors a coordinated supranational 
policy, a readaption program for unemployed workers, 
construction of workers' housing, and protection against 
unrestricted coal imports. After the coal crisis of 1956-
57 the prominent Socialist members, Gerhard Nederhorst and 
Berhard Dreissig, presented in the name of the Socialist 
group the idea of supranational public oivnership of all 
ECSC mines together with planned coal p.rdduction and 
distribution. 
During the six years of the Common Assembly's opera-
tton none of its political groups made a serious attempt 
to form a supranational political party or tried to coor-
dinate the policy of the national parties on a supranatimal 
basis. The main reason for this seems to be that the ,: 
Coamon Assembly, meeting at a supwanational level, operates 
in a political vacuum. The day-to-day questions are too 
technical to generate popular support·and concern only a 
restricted clientele. The Assemblyi like all ECSC insti-
tutions, has failed to arouse a broader interest, even in 
issues concerning the general public.
47 But despite all 
47 Economist,CLXXVI (August 13, 195S). 
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political and organizatioaal abortcoainga and ··11aited 
influence on the Community affairs, the Coamon Assembly, 
and not the High Authority or the Council of Ministers, 
embodies the true impulse of the supranational idea. The 
relative unattractiveness of the work in the Common Assembq 
bas brought in a considerable number·of dedicated people' 
who represent the main hope of supranational cooperation. 
Tbe ECSC Court of Justice 
-- --- --- - ----
The role of the Court is to ensure the rule of law 
in interpretation and application of the ECSC Treaty and 
of its implementing regulations. 48 As such the ECSC 
Court acts t7ith exclttsive jurisdiction in the realms of 
both internatione-il and inunicipal law of the Community. 
The Court acts as an International Tribunal in any 
dispute between member states concerning the application 
of the Treaty which cannot be settled within the Council 
of Ministers or by direct diplomatic negotiations. The 
Court's jurisdiction becomes compulsory at the request 
of one of the states, party to the dispute. 49 Equally 
:I 
within the Court's international jurisdiction is the ~ 
settlement of any dispute among the member states related 
to the purpose of the EBSC Treaty, if submitted to it on 
the basis of an arbitration agreement. 50 
48 
49 
50 
1 
The ECSC Treaty, Article 31. 
The ECSC Treaty, Article 89. 
Ibid. 
.. 
.~· .· 
.. 
' J 
88 
As the Supreme Court of the CollllDunity, the Court 
can annul, on petition of the member states or of the 
High Authority, the decisions of the council of Minister• 
or of the common Assembly. Such an appeal for annulment 
can be based only on the ground of lack of legal competence 
in that the Council or the Assembly overstep the limits 
of their power, as defined by the ECSC Treaty, or on the 
ground of substantial procedural violation when the Council 
or the Assembly make their decision without the preliminiry 
consultations required by the Treaty. 51 
The Court acts as a supreme legal consultant of tbe 
ECSC in the case of modification of the ECSC Treaty. Such 
modifications, jointly proposed by the High Authority and 
the Council of Ministers, are submitted to the Cou~t for 
examination "in all elements of law and factn before trans-
mittal to the Assembly for final approvai. 52 
The Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over the 
individual members of the High Authority. In virtue of 
Art. 12 of the ECSC Treaty, only the Court can remove 
from office a High Authority member who bas committed a 
gross fault or who no longer fulfills the conditions 
necessary for the exercise of his functions. The Court 
can discipline its own members and the advocates general 
and remove them from office if, in the unanimous opinion 
51 
52 
Ibid., Article 38. 
Ibid., Article 95 • 
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\ 
ol all the other meabera of the Court they no longer 
fulfill the requisite conditions for holding their office!
3 
As a civil arbit~ation tribunal the Court can rule 
tn terms of the arbitration clause included in all public 
or private law contrac'ta related to the ECSC coal and steel 
sectors. 54 ,) 
The most important role of the Court is to act as an 
administrative tribunal. As such, the Court deals with the 
differences between the ECSC institutions and the states, 
enterprises, or individuals, who can challenge the admini-
strative actsr of the ECSC organs and to v1hom the ECSC 
Treaty grants the right of judicial review. 
The Court is automatically open to the member states 
and to the ECSC institutions. The enterprises and the 
individuals can appeal to the t,;ourt only when the.y are 
directly involved in a dispute or litigation birougi1t before 
it. Being the supreme judicial institution of the ECSC, 
the Court's decisions are final and without appeal. 
In principle, the Court is a legal and not a poli-
tical or economic organ whose decisions are expected to 
be based on legal judgment and not on political considera-
tion. This, however, is wishful thinking as it is im-
possible to decide on purely· legal grounds when the meaSUl9a 
of the High Authority do cause severe econon1ic dislocations, 
or define legally the misapplication of power or the clear 
53 Ibid o, A1~ticles 7 and 13. 
54 Ibid., Article 42. 
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· disregard o~ the ECSC Treaty. It is equally impossible 
to decide, on purely legal grounds, certain cases dealing 
with technical rnatte~s that m.ay be presented to the Court 
on the basis of the arbitration clause. 
The planners of the ECSC Treaty considered it to be 
a supranational constitution and the Court as one of the 
cornerstones of the future federal structure which, in 
their belie£, the ECSC inaugurated. The most important 
role of the ~ourt was to interpret the fundamental ECSC 
-objectives o But the lanrzyers around the Court were no i; 
better prepared for this supranational experiment than were 
the ministers, parliamentarians, or interest group leaders. 
Creative jurisprudence was nearly a forgotten art due to 
the manner in which rigid positivism had dominated West 
European thinking for almost a century. The modern legal 
thought of "Little Europe," still dominated by Leon Duguit 
and Hans Kelsen, bad little use for the independent thinki,w 
of the genre of John ~iliarshall or Benjan1in Cardozo. 
The actual role of t·he court has been far more modmt 
than had been provided by the treaty. It never acted as 
an International Tribunal, as all differences between the 
member states were settled within the Council of Ministers 
or by direct negotiations; nor did it have any occasion 
in its capacity of Supreme court to examine the validity 
of the decisions oi1the Counci~ ot Mini1tera or examine r 
the validity of the election of the High Authority members, 
or to act as the Disciplinary Tribunal. During all its 
experi ... ence, the Court has acted only as an administrative 
, .. Ir_;-- J~.-,, ,;,-,::.~ .;.. ,.-· ........... ·~~--~.~.:,:,-'." \ ... . 
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tribunal, dealing with the appeals brought against the 
High Authority decisions by the governments, the enter-
prises, and occasionally by individuals. It acted as a 
civil arbitratio~ tribunal in cases brought in under the 
.0 
arbitration clause. Even though there are no direct 
powers of enforcement, the Court's decisions have not 
been challenged by the governments or by the enterprises. 
With the ECSC Treaty as the main source of law 
and the virtual absence of a well developed legal systea, 
tailored to the needs of the ECSC 9 the Court had an ex-
cellent possibility to contribute substanti lly to the 
development of the supranational law of "Little urope~" 
Even if the municipal laws of the C..:ommuu1i ty were reduced 
to a secondary role as a source of interpretation of the 
ECSC legal terminology, their diversity and their influence 
on the legal thought of the Community nations cannot be 
ignored. The heavy reliance upon French administrative 
principles and law was probably the happiest choice as 
they form the basis for Belgian and Italian admini~trative 
law, while the German and Dutch laws differ considera-ly 
both from each other and beforce the Comn1uni ty' s admini-
stration and jurisprudence tvill succeed in bringing the 
different legal and administrative systems together, and 
in developing its own supranational administrative law. 
In summary, there were certain weaknesses i11 the 
entire institutional processes of the ECSCo These tended 
to negate any trending toward European unity and heightened 
., 
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the conflict between supranational cooperation and national 
particularism. Indeed, the whole political process of the 
ECSC operated in a certain vacuum~ being reduced to a 
rather restricted clientele: the High Authority bureau-
crats, committed to the idea of supranational cooperation, 
the governmepts and interest groups, concerned primarily 
with their own interests, and the Common Assembly parlia-
mentarians, who were virtually only spectators. -
,•'•-; ... ,. ' 
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TOWARD A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
., 
'I, 
Tbe years 1954 and 1955 were years of crisis not 
only for the ECSC but also for the whole concept of 
supranational cooperation in Western Europe. The ECSC 
was weakened by a protracted recession. To the economic 
difficulties were added political complications. Since 
October 1952 the federalist~dominated Common Assembly 
worked on the project of the European Political Community, 
which was intended to lay the basos for the federation of 
the six ECSC states. It was expected that if adopted the 
project would extend the scope of economic integration 
beyond coal and steel and offer the possibility of coa-
bining it with the European Defense Community. The 
proposed European Defense Co1nmuni ty was iraportant to the 
federalists in the conuuon Assembly, offering certain 
hopes for a possible British participation, which in turn 
might have won for the federalist camp other European 
states participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
..... _ 
zationo Hut on August 30, 1954~ the EDC treaty was re-
jected by the French National Assembly and all hope for 
British participation in West European unification experi-
aents as well as the hope for an establishment of the 
political Community of the Six disappeared for the 
torseeable future.· The federalists of the Common Aaaeably 
'\ 
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bad to liait their aspirations to the countries of the \, 
Community of Six and tvi thin it to the integration of the 
economic and social sectors. 
In May, 1955, the Common Assembly passed a resolution 
urging the ECSC Council of Ministers to call one or more 
conferences of the six governments to prepare the plans 
for tt11e next; step toward further economic and social inte-
gration 0£ "Little Europe." In the political at1nosphere 
of 1955, especially in· France and Italy 9 the Assembly 
resolution made not the slightest impression. 
The initiative to continue the integration policy 
came from Paul-Henri Spaak, then Belgian For·eign Minister, 
who succeeded in aligning the support of the Benelux 
; 
countries for a new integration program known as Relance 
.P Europeenne. The program contained concrete proposals for 
the coordination of the European transport system including 
trucking, coastal shipping, and civil aviation. There was 
to be an over~all CGsnmuni ty energy policy, including 
electricity and natural gas, under the extended power of 
~ the High Authority. The Relance also called for the 
establisl1ment of a ne,~, High Autl1orri ty dealing \Vi th n~clear 
research and peaceful uses of atomic energy on a supra-
national basis. To this plank Jan ~eyen, the Dutch Foreign 
Minister,·added his own proposal for a progressive reduc-
tion of all tariffs between the six Comrnuni ty countries. 
The Beyen plan was an adaptation of the Ouchy Economic 
... 
Convention of 1932 ~etween Belgium, Holland and 
. .., [, 
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lfbile the Relance Europesnne was under pre-
paration, Jean l1)fonnet resigned in November 1954 as CbairDBn 
of the High Authority. This necessitated a meeting of the 
ECSC Council of JAinisters to fill the vacat~d position. 
Spaak and Beyen seized the occasion to sponsor the Relance 
proposal and suggested, instead of the ordinary aeeting 
of the Council of Ministers, that a call be made for an 
international conference of the six community governments, 
which eventually would be open to other states that were 
willing to participate. 
The Messina conference 
The Italian government was the first to accept 
Spaak's idea of a conference and proposed as a meeting 
place the Scilian city of Messina. The Italian govern-
ment had a genuine desire to attract "Little Europe's" 
attention to Southern Italy as an underdeveloped area ot 
Europe. The conference in Messin opened in June, 1955, 
and showed that in spite of the rejection of the European 
Defense Community and the Political Connnuni ty <) the idea 
of supranational cooperation still made considerable 
progress. All delegations in Messina agreed, in principle, 
to further extension of the economic integration within 
the Community. The only disagreement between them was on 
the method of approach. The Benelux delegation favored 
1 Cbronigue !!! la Po!itigue ~~rang\r~, X (July-Nov.~957) 
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•vertical integration," consisting of ext~_,ision of power• 
of the ECSC High Authority to the sectors of transport 
and over-au; emer9y policy. Nuclear research was to be 
integrated under an independent authority. The German 
delegation proposed ~Horizontal integration," consisting 
I 
of integration of the whole six national economies into 
a single market. 2 The French delegation, in view of the 
ptilitical situation at home, was not very favorable to 
the promotion of supranational projects. 3 
The Conference lasted only three)days. The ministers, 
fully aware of the importance of the matter, tried to 
avoid all controversial debate in order to prevent a dead-
locko The n1inisters unanimously agreed on the need to 
integrate European nuclear research and rnade a serious 
attempt to plan for coordination of national social legis-
lation within the Cornmunitye Finally, paying lip-service 
to their Italian hosts, they acknowledged their moral 
obligation to help economically the underdeveloped area• 
of the Community. The work of the Messina Conference 
resulted in the appointment of three special commissions: 
the first to study the integration of the transport and 
energy sector under the extended power of the High Author-
ity; the second to deal with the integration problems of 
the nuclear energy;· and the third to study the possibility 
Le Monde, June 5, 1935. 
----3 Ibid. 
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of creating a common market through integration of the 
whole of the national economies. 
--· The Intergovernmental Committee and the seaak Report 
,) 
In July, 1955, Spaak took the initiative and created 
under his chairmanship an intergovernmental co1n1ni ttee of 
technical and economic experts appointed by the govern-
ments aud led by the heads of the Community's six diplo-
matic missions accredited to Brussels. Its purpose was 
to extend within an entirely new organizational basis the 
work of the three study commissions appointed by the Mes~ 
sina Conference. 
On April 21, 1956, the intergovernmental coD1111ittee 
presented the so-called Spaak Report, which proved to be 
a most important document for the West European supra-
national integration. The main emphasis of the Report 
was on the establishment of the Comn1on ~iarket, which would 
include transport, agriculture, investment policy, and on 
the coordination of atomic research for peaceful purposes 
under the European Atornic Commission. From the mass of 
technical anca econoinic data a supranational European 
pbiloso11hy began to take mo1~e concrete form. The Report 
referred, in general terms, to Europe as a whole, tacitly 
including the Hritain~led "schizmatics," as well as Franco 
s·pain and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It opened 
' 
with a nostalgic European lool, into tA1e past, pointing 
out the dwnline ot a continent which once had the monopoly 
,. 
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of the industrial and technical know-how and had access 
to important resources in its overseas possessions, but 
which was now declining, as the authors of the Report 
believed, because of its internal divisions. 
The main political objective, stated by the Report, 
was that the establishment of the Common l\1arket would in 
the relatively near future lead, if not to political unity, 
at least to a closely knit bloc of European states which 
would be able to act as an effective "Third Force" between 
the United States and the Soviet bloca 4 Spaak, soon to 
become Secretary of NATO, considered Europe as solidly 
anchored to the Western camp, where it would play an active 
role in the Western alliance system. 
The authors of the Report, stressing the importance 
ot the establish1nent of the Common Market, expressed, for 
the first time in clear terms, the political and economic 
ideology of the European integration. The integrated 
econo1ny lllas, in the views of its authors, clearly subol'~·· 
dinated to political aims. The creation of a vast area of 
commo~ economic policy would not only help raise the 
standard of living, but the increasing economic i11terde-
pendence of the European countries would help create more 
·, 
harmonious political relations between them. The Report 
admitted that it was not possible immediately to establish 
a free market but expressed the belief that a competitive 
4 Edward Strauss, Common Sense about the Common Market, (London: George lllen &·onwin, tta., '1957}, p.13, 1 I 
'I 
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• 
aarket would virtually automatically emerge once the 
national meas·ures of protection and discrimination were~ 
abolished. 
The authors of the report shared the rather optimis-
tic theories originated by Arthur Pigou5 and further deve-
loped by Jean Monnet, that a big market is by its very 
nature dynamic because it forces business to invest, 
increase production, inprove quality, and make use of~~-
to-date methods of production and marketing. The Report 
further recommended gradual elimination of all interferenre 
by the nation=states in the economic affairs and a progres-
sive introduction of a free movement of persons, good, and 
services. Regarded as equally necessary was the continuous 
adaptation of national comme~cial policies toward the 
achievement of a 61European'' economic and co1nmercial policy 
based on a single set of supranational administrative and 
legal principles. 
On agricultual policy the Report was more conserva-
tive, foreseeing a long period of adjustment before the 
West European agriculture would be economically strong -
enough to exist without protective tariffs and state sub-
aidies. Additionally 9 the Report stressed the neccessity 
of over-all social adjuatment and the introduction ot 
S Arthur C. Pigou, prominent British ~~onomist and author 
· of The Transition from War to Peace(Nei,, Yort.r: Ox:ford ~:!~(~:~~~n~r~:~~i~~ ~~:;~h~fb!~~~k~~}!r~:;!~;d i6e thinking of European functionalists. 
, ....... , 
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equal all-Community social legislation. 
It was pointed out in the Report that the establisb-
aent of the Common Market would require a relatively long 
transition period, during which national trade barriers 
would gradually be removed while the economies adjusted 
I I . ( \.\ :J~\ \, 
to the netv conditions. It was felt that the transition 
should be regu]jJlted from above by a supranational organi-
zation in close cooperation with the governments, although 
the length of the:period of adjustment was not specified. 
The Report proposed to establish a supranational 
European atomic community, responsible for the direction, 
research, and application of nuclear energy toward peace-
ful purposes, emphasizing the importance of the nuclear 
power which could to a great extent remedy the West Euro-
pean dependence on the imported sources of energy. The 
Report called for a coordination and rationalization of 
the nuclear resear~b and replace1nent by a powerful supra-
national atomic commission of the present national efforts, 
which are inefficient, too costly for the individual 
1tates, and often leading to duplication of work. Thia 
would rnalce possible the coordination and planning of 
nuclear research and its application. 
The Report strongly recommended the carrying out of 
the economic integration through the supranational organi-
zation1 'j) tvhose mer;m'berr states agreed in advance to renounce 
their sovereign rights within the economically integrated 
aectors in favor of the supranational institutions,even 
--.. .,. .... ; 'a .. ~ ..< , ..•• ,. , 
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\ 
though this might lead to a split within the Western Caap. 
t\\'li /1 
It warn~d against the pursuit of economic integration 
through an international organization, underlining its 
two main wealU1esses. These were, first, its relative 
tnstability, as every sovereign state has the right to 
leave such organization at will, and,second, the imper-
fection of the decision-making process of the interna-
t . l . t· 6 lODa organiza 10Do As the most important decisions 
aust be taken by unanimous vote, the use of veto would 
lead to a coalition of the national interests or would 
bring the Co1n1nuni ty to a stand-still. The lleport stated 
that a supranational organization could better solve the 
conflict of national interests, underlining that the uni-
fication of Europe is the ultimate goal to which economic 
integration is only a means. It pointed out that the 
international organization would probably facilitate the 
participation of Britain and other \Vest Eui~opean states, 
but-, the insistence on national sovereignty vvould postpone 
and probably delay indefinitely the objectives of economic 
. t t· 7 1n egra ion. 
The Report recommended to extend the jurisdiction 
ot the ECSC Asse1nbly and the Higl1 Court to the Common 
Market and Euratom and to make them the common suprana-
tional institutions of the whole European community. 
6 
7 
I 
Strauss, op. cit., p.73. 
Ibid., p.74. 
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the drafters of the Report were not in favor ot extending 
\ the powers of the ECSC Consultative Committee over the 
C&mmon Market and Euratom as this body might become a 
troublesome stronghold of vested interests and act as a 
brake of the whole organization. Very realistically, the 
Report also pointed out that neither the ~ommon Market 
nor Euratom was yet ready for a strong independent supra-
national organ like the ECSC High Authority, which created 
in many political arid business circles an uneasy feeling 
and concern about the rule of bureaucrats. The Report 
proposed as the main decision-making o.rgan of the Common 
Market and Euratorn the Council of Ministers which would 
make all decisions of political character and whose :·1 
authority and prestige nobody would question. 
Negotiations and the Signing of the Roae Treaty 
On February 19, 1957, the Community priae ministers 
•et in Paris, where they reached a prel .. iminary agreement 
to include i11 the Common Market, as an inseparable part 
of the/ European Coc .. 1uni ty, Algeria arad all French overseas 
departments considered administratively a part of France. 
The ministers also signed a separate Convention valid 
for five years by the terms of which the overseas terri-
tories of the c.;omrnuni ty were to be progressively opened 
to all members on the condition that, aside from trade, 
-
they also participate with investments for the development 1~ 
,I.' 
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of the territories. Finally, the ministers agreed that 
.within a month a new conference should meet in Rome to 
prepare the definitive text of the Treaties on the Common 
Market and Euratom. 
The Conference in Rome was delayed for a few weeks 
because the French, supported by the Helgians, now wanted 
to include permanently their overseas territories in the 
European Communities. After some negotiations, a compro~ 
mise formula was found in the Association of the Belgian, 
Dutch, and French overseas dependencies. The Association 
limited the relationship to the European Community to the 
provisions for a customs union and economic aid. 
The T~eaties, signed on March 25, 1957, in Rome, 
established the twin organization, the European Economic 
Community (commonly referred to as the Common Market) and 
the European Atomic Community (c-0mmonly known as Euratoa). 
The Treaty of the European Economic Community is a 
volW11inous document of 248 articles to which are attached 
22 annexes -- an attempt to list all industrial and agri-
cultural products of 0 Li ttle Europe o" In the prearnble, 
the member governments emphasi~ed the political concept 
of the Treaty, the main goal of which is "to establish 
the foundation of an ever closer union among the European 
peoples ,mere the fusion of essential interests will 
substitute for historical rivalry.8 
8 The te2tt of tl1e CornnJon11 l\1arrl~et Treaty was reprinted in 
the Euroeean Yearbootc ~IW( ].958); the text of the Euratoa 
Trealy in flie~ur0Eea11 Yearbook,V(l959). 
\ 
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In the first part of the Treaty (Art. 1-8), in three 
main principles, is expressed the leading idea containing 
the basic political philo.sophy of the functio11al integra-
9 tion. The first principle is the gradual realization of 
the Treaty's objectives. The Co~mon Market is to be es-
tablished progressively in three stages of four years each 
with the possibility of prolonging the transition period 
~ 
for an additional three years if necessary. During each 
stage the Community is to carry through a certain group. 
of actions necessary for the reali~ation of the Common 
Market, prepared in:.~.advance and pursued concurrently by 
each member state. The Treaty subordinates the economic 
life of the Community to the coordinated direction of the 
governments and the Council of Ministers. The transition 
from the first to the second stage depends on unanimous 
agreement that every state has fulfilled the specific 
objectives of the first stage. Should the Council realize 
that the objectives of the first stage are not fulfilled, 
the transition period can be extended for an additional 
one or two years. 9 
The second principle concerns the prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of national origin. The 
drafters of the Treaty abandoned the idea of establishing 
9 In the light of recent developments, however, it can 
safely be assumed that integration will proceed without 
undue difficulty and presumably will be accomplished 
well in advance of the original schedule. See also, 
infra., PP• 118-122. 
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a tree market and hoped to make it more competiitive by 
ruling out national discriminations from the economic life 
of the Community. 
The third principle is one of pe,rmanency. In prin-
ciple, the Treaty is irreversible, concluded for an unde11-
termined period of time (in contrast to the ECSC Treaty 
which expires after five years). The Treaty can be modi~ 
fied, if necessary, by changing conditions. But the 
Community itself is of a presumably perpetual character. 
The second part of the Treaty deals with the basis 
of the Community (Arts. 9-84), consisting of provisions 
for integration of four economic sectors of fundamental 
importance to the Community. The first basic sector 
(Arts. 9-38) institutes a customs union between member 
states of the Community. The customs union if to provide 
for free movement of goods by progressive elimination of 
., customs duties and all quantitative restrictions between 
the member states and protect the Community economy by 
the establishment of a cornmon customs tariff and a common 
coamercial policy toward third countries. \Vhile the common 
cust1oms tariff toward third countries was to be eatab-
lisbed at once, the tariffs and restrictions within the 
Community should be reduced successively by 30 per cent 
duri11g tl1e first two four-year transition periods and 
40 per cent during the last stage. The eliminatioi1 of 
tariffs shall not cause any member state substantial so-
cial or economic difficulties, and the progreseive reduc-
tion tariffs shall not necessarily be the same in all 
\ 
1~ 
Co1111unity countries. ... , .... 
The second basic sector (Arts. 38-47) deals with 
the extension of the Common Market to agriculture and 
trade, with the products of soil, stockbre~ding and 
fisheries. The agriculture! policy was designed to in-
crease the agricultural productivity of the Community 
thro·ugh a r.at·ionali~ation and modernization of European 
agriculture, raise the standard of farmers and farm labo.N!l·s, 
stabilize the agricultural market, and ensure regular sup-
plies and reasonable prices to consumers. 
The drafters took a realistic view of the, in aany 
ways, unsatisfactory state of the Community's agriculture. 
The Treaty provides for a common agricultural development 
program with coordinated agricultural research and occu-
pational training in order to increase the productivity 
and efficiency of agricultural production. The Treaty 
imposes a rather strict control on the operation of the 
agricultural market, providing for compulsory coordina-
. .1... tion of the various market organizations, centralized 
price control of agricultural products, centralized dis-
tribution of agricu/itural subsidies, and central control 
of import and export of agricultural products. As for 
the transition period, the Treaty accepts the temporary 
preservation of the regional market~. The agricultural 
provisions of the Treaty do "not deal with details, leaving 
to the ~ouncil of Ministers a considerable discretion in 
formulating the supranational agricultural policy. 
,, 
•'-"-'• 
Although the Council of Ministers has already irreversibly 
agreed to join together industrial policies, the other 
half of· the com1non future, farm policy, as yet remains ub+-
aol ved. The third basic sector deals with the free move-
aent of persons, goods and capital (A;ri,@• 48-73). The -
Trea,ty provtde1s for the free circulation o:f workers within 
the territory of the Community, which is to be completely 
tree by the end of the first four-year transition period~ 
The free movement of labor is to be facilitated not only 
by the abolition of all existing immigration restrictions 
but also by coordinating the work of the national employ-
aent offices and by unification of the social and welfare 
organizations. The free movement of persons was extended 
to the ri~ht of all citizens of the member states to es-
tablish themselves anywhere within the Community's terri-
tory and there exercise freely any occupationo Equally 
tree from all restrictions shall be services of industrial 
and commercial character as well as artisan activities arm 
liberal professionso The Treaty also makes provisions for 
f~ee movement of capital in the form of current payments, 
investments and loans, pointing out that priority should 
be given to its reali~ation. 
' 
The fourth basic factor of the common Market is. 
that of transport (Arts o 74-85). The Treaty prro,rides for 
the abolition of all discriminatory rates for all Commu-
nity transport by rail, highway or by water. But the 
operation and the maintenance of the transport facilitjea, 
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aa far as they are in public ownership, remain in the do-
main of the member states. 
The third part of the Treaty (Arts. 85-130) deals 
---, ---- with tqe policy of the Community. In order to establish 
a common competitive market, the Treaty prohibits the 
cartels, moqopolies, and business concentrations that . 
prevent or restrict competition within the Community. The 
anti-cartel provision 0£ the Treaty does not apply to the 
business associations, which contribute to the promotion 
of technical or economic progress, to the publicly owned 
enterprises, pr to the state monopqJlies. The Treaty pro-
hibits the practice of dumping within the Community, and 
the council of l\1inisters is free to determine average 
Community minimum prices of all products on the Common 
Market. The Treaty declares as incompatible with the 
principles of the Common l\iarlcet all state subsidies which 
will affect business competition. Hut the Council of 
Ministers is to encourage the policy of state subsidies 
and eventually supplement them from the common resources 
if it serves the economic development of the retarded 
regions of the Community, or furthers the realization of 
projects considered important for the common interest of 
the Community • 
The Treaty does not directly affect the fiscal 
autonomy of the states but its provisions for a gradual 
coordination of the taxation policy will ultimately lead 
to the swne fiscal principles and taxation rates in all 
:( 
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the Coamunity member states. 
The Treaty does not interfere with the judicial 
autonomy of the state, but provides for progressive uni-
fication of the commercial laws, judicial and arbitration 
procedurea, and administrative provisions directly affect-
. ing the operation of ti1e Com:non P1rfarket. 
The Treaty does 11ot interfere with the economic 
policy, the exportation and importation, the balance of 
payments, and the monetary policy of each member state 
toward third countries, but limits its provisions only to 
coordination, to free exchange of goods, and payments with-
in the Community. Ultimately, however, the economic auton-
omy of the 1nember states will be limited, _first by the 
common. Co1nn1unity tariffs and later by the provisions for 
the last period of transition·when the Council of Ministen 
shall take measures to negotiate the commercial treaties 
with third countries on behalf of the Community directly. 
The Treaty provides for a coordination of social 
legislation within the Community; particular.ly the gradual, 
legal, and administrative unification of the social secur-
ity systems, as well as labor and etnployment regulations. 
Alre~dy during the first transition periods, the member 
governments did much to abolish wage disparity. 
The fourtht· part of the Treaty (Arts. 131-136) deals 
with the attachment to the Conimunity of the overseas coun-
tries and territories under Belgian, Dutch, ~nd French 
dominance, which was a sine gu(! non condition for France 
........ ' ' '"""II '1,1 ~-·.,·· 
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to join the Co1111on Market. The overseas dependencies ot 
"Little Europe" ~e gradually abolishing the trade and 
customs barriers to the Community state members, but in 
relation to third countries can keep their tariffs as 
high as they judge necessary to protect their developing 
economy. Through contributions of the member#states, the 
Community shall establish a special fund in order to 
finance not only the economic development but also public 
works, education, and public health projects of the over-
seas territories. 
Evaluation of the Common Market Treaty 
The comnion Atarket Treaty was intended to be a 
cornerstone in the foundation of an economic ans politi-
cal union, but in its present form it still remains a 
rather ambitious plan for the future. 
The formal, strictly economic provisions of the 
Treaty underline its definite political goal in the first 
phrase of the preamble: "Determined to establish the foun-
datio·ns of an ever closer union·· among the European peoples!' 
Th~ politifal character of the Treaty is even more accen-
tuaied by the belief of its drafters in the relatively 
unlimited use of the economy as a political instrument. 
In their views, the priinary moving force behind the Coa-
aon Market is the ·dynamics of the economic life which 
the supranational authority, reposing in the Council of 
Ministers, could direct toward political and social ends. 
\ 
' 
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A more closely knit economic union was seen as a tranai-__ 
tional stage toward political federation. 
The only clearly arid explicitly state~ provision of 
/ 
V 
the Treaty, on which the governments fully agreed·and 
intended to implement, are the ones dealing with tariff 
policy, prohibition of dumping practices and the libera-
lization of the exchange of goods, capital, and services. 
The drafters of the Treaty hoped that the increased trade 
within the community would lead to closer interdependence 
and that the resulting economic pressure would help to 
realize the ~ommon Market objectives almost automatically. 
But the fact that ~Little Europe" to a very large extent 
depends on import of raw material and foodstuff a11d export 
of her manufactured goods to the outsi.de countries limits 
considerably the effects of the Common Market. 
As the ~ommon Market objective, ioe., the political 
integration of "Little Europe," goes beyond the economic 
sector, its realization depends more on the performance 
of the Commuaity institutions than on eventual economic 
pre~sure. The most important Treaty provisions of insti-
tutional character dealing-with the unification of the 
social, fiscal, and commercial legislation, the integrated 
transport, agriculture, and investment policy are written 
only in the form of recommendations. These provisions 
would lead to the creati~n of_ __ , a truly integrated economy, 
but they would also require important changes in the poli-
tical and economic structure of the member states. Today 
• 
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these provisions remain only decisions in principle for 
the most parte 10 There is no denying, however, that pro-
gress is being made. 
The common .. Market claims to be a supranational organ-
ization, but at present its supranational organs, the 
Assembly and the Commission, are too weak to make decisions 
over the heads of tl1e Council of Ministers. The future of 
the Common Market depends, in the main, on the \~Jill of the 
member governments to carry on over long years the policy 
of closer union, as they pledged in Rome in 1957. 
The authors of the Treaty realistically accepted the 
fact that it would require years before the Common Market 
would reach the final stage of operation. This realistic 
appraisal forced tl1e drafters of the Treaty to deal, on 
the basis of the available facts of the years 1956-57 when 
the Treaty was negotiated and signed, with the political 
~-~ economic situation twelve, fifteen years ahead which, 
as has been evident, was beyond the capacity of even the 
most exceptional minds to foresee. An early e:,-cample of 
the rapidly changing situation was the events in Africai 
which made part four of the Treaty, dealing with the 
association of the overseas territories to the Co11JDunity, ~ 
obsolete even b~fore th~. Common Tularket started its opera-
tion. In part, due to De Gaulle 0 s intransigence, the 
political future of. the Common Market remains uncertain~~-· 
m Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "Two Instincts Tug at Europe," 
New York Times Magazine, November 13, 1960 ,p.125, • 
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but whether the, Common Market will continue further along 
the road of economic integration or will remain merely a 
customs union, the economic ties within the Community have 
been so strengthened that none of its memb~rs can today 
return to the closed shell of the nation-state. This ia 
the greatest merit of the Treaty. 
.;, 
The Institutions 2! the European Community 
The original agencies of the European Community 
counted separate Assemblies for the ECSC, the Common Mar-
ket, and Euratom, with a new fourth assembly being created 
to act as a coordinating parliamentary organ for the Com-
aunity as a wholeo The proposal met with strong opposi-
tion from the pro-European parliamentarians who instead 
proposed to increase membership in the ECSC Common Assemb.J.y 
to serve under the name of the "European Assembly" as the 
only parliamentary organ of the Community.
11 The govern-
aents, in order to avoid debates about the organizational 
structure of the Common Market institutions in the home 
par.,liaments which cer·tainly would protract the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty, accepted the view of the parliamen-
tarians. A special ~Convention relating to certain insti-... 
tutions common to the European Co1nmuni ties n \Vas added to 
the Common Market and Euratom Treaties, amending the text 
11 Arthur Robertson, European Institutions, 1,ptl.57. 
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by establiahing a atq_g_le parliamentary body tor the whole 
Community. 
In May, 1958, the European Assembly established ita 
permanent secretariat with headquarters in Luxemburg. The 
secretariat communicates directly with all deputies, the 
High Autl1ori ty, the two Commissions, and the office of 
the Council of Ministers. The Assembly normalized its 
sessions, meeting regularly three times a yearo The whole 
functioning of the European Assembly was a great improve-
ment over its predecessor, the ECSC Common Assembly. As in 
bodies like the League of Nations and the U11ited Nations, 
the influence of the Assembly increased thruugh parliamen-
tary practice and in dealing with matters of everyday busi-
ness. Thus was slow·ly established a usage which came to 
rest not on the letter of the Treaty but on precedent. The 
Assembly deals alternately vti th matters of the Comn1on Mar-
ket, ECSC, and Euratom, following the agenda prepared .iA 
advance by the secretariat. 
The Council of Ministers began to realize the impor-
tance of the parliao1entaurian influence on the Commru1i ty 's 
,i interest groups and on public opinion,_ and even if the 
Assembly still remains basically a consultative organ and 
lacks clear lines_ of political responsilili ty, its voice 
today cannot be igno-:rred. It has progressively enlarrged 
its powers and influence and has established itself firmly 
in the Community as an institution that very likely may be 
a forerunner of European federation. 
~"'· 
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I Less successful than in the field of parliamentary 
control over the Community administration v;as the Assembly"& 
dealings in political matters. The Assembly showed con-
siderable initiative, but is still handicapped by the lack 
of a genuine grassroot support. The supranational spirit 
dominating the Assembly did not ·yet reach the national 
constituencies of the parliamentarians. The three poli-
tical blocs overcame within the Assembly the national 
divisions, but none of them is yet strong enough to fora 
a supranational political party nor even to promote a 
closer cooperation between the pro-European national parti•. 
An i1nportant project toward thlf···realization of a 
European federation was that of direct election. But the 
direct electoral pr.oposal proved to be too radical a de-
parture from the outlook of the member governments to 
receive very favorable response from the Council of Mini-
sters.12 However, despite all the shortcomings of the 
European Assen1bly 1 of which the lacl{ of popular support 
- c.£is probably tl1e n1os t serious, that body baa shown increas-
ing responsiveness to the supranational idea and genuine 
efforts to bring parliamentary democracy from the state 
to the supranational levelo The proposal for direct elec-
tion to the Assembly demonstrated the European parliamen-
tarians• confidence in the streglb of Coamunity insti-
tut·iOA1S·. 
12 Recently, only Chancellor Ade~auer apparently expresaMI a wish to hold the elections to the European Assembly together with the German federal electionsoDer Seiegel, (.September 14,1960) As reported in the Econornis\,{L<n-don) March 22, 1963. 
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'ftle Econoaic and Social Co1111ittee,-by -the provision• 
of Art. 5 of the "Convention relating to certain instita-
' . 
tions common to the European Communities," is a single 
advisory body of the Commun.i ty. It consists of 121 11e•-
bers, composed of representatives of the various cate-
gories of economic and s0cial life. 
The chief role of the Committee, besides advising 
the Commission and the Council of Ministers in all cases 
when the economic i~terests are in question, is to watch 
that the institutions do not deviate from the economic and 
social policy established by the Treaty. The main streng111 
of the Committee lies in exercising the pressure of the. 
national interest grou·ps both on the government, at home 
and the ministers in the Council. As the pressure groups 
are predominantly influenced by the promotion of their own 
economic interest rather than by the long-term Community 
policy, the influence of the Committee on the Community 
affairs remains rather negative. 
With Articles 3 and 4 of the "Convention relating 
to certain institutions" a single ~ourt of Justice was es-
tablished for the whole Community. Expecting that the 
field of the Cowrt 0 s activities would be considerably 
enlarged, the ~onvention made the provision that only 
"jurists of recognized competence, qualified to f~lfill 
the conditio11s required for the holding of the· highest 
judicial office in their respective countriesn (Art. 4) 
could be chosen as judges and advocates-general of the 
Court. 
. I 
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__ The co-unity Court was inaugurated on October 7, 
1958, with Albert M. Donner, a prominent Dutch lawyer, aa 
its first presidint. Hut up to the end of 1961 it has 
dealt almost exclusiv~ly with ECSC cases. It heard only 
three cases relating to the Common Market, and these con-
cerned the appeal of former commission employees against 
unlawful dismissai. 13 
The Council of Ministers as a single institution 
.. 
has full control of the Community administration and is 
free from parliamentary control and interference. All 
important ~ommunity decisions are subjects of its unani-
mous approval. The Community was based on the assumption 
that European ideals would be shared by all member govern-
ments, and that the Council of Ministers would be their 
main depository. When the foundations of the European 
Community were established, it was believed that there 
existed a basic consensus which would gradually lead to 
political unity. No institutional provisions were set up ·· 
to deal with a deadlock of a political nature resulting 
from disagreements among the member state-s within the 
1 ..
Council of l\,1inister·s over the l;ommuni ty Os basic principles, 
~a~ti&uilirij if such disagreements should occur between 
the three big powers, France, Germany, and Italy. The 
theories of the functionalist approach, gr~unded on a 
·' 
13 Robertson, op. cit., p. 251. 
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close interrelationship between economics and politics, 
led the drafters to believe that economic integration, 
creating irreversible ties between the member states, 
would be strong enough to force the governments to ful-
f ·11 th. bl. t· t d th C ·t 14 1 eir o iga ions owar e ommuni.y. 
The position of the Council of Ministers within the 
Community is further strengthened by the direct super-
vision of the administrative operations. The Council ap-
points and directs a very important intergovernmental 
committee of experts and officials and has a free hand to 
determine its task and competence. The intergovernmental 
committee proved a successful means to prevent the develop-
. 
ment of an independent supranational administration. The 
members of the committee are public servants of the member 
goverDDlents, temporarily transferred to work on the varioua 
administrative and technical projects of the Common Mar~et. 
~bey are paid by, and remain individually responsible to, 
their national .. administrations, but like the members of 
the Council of Ministers themselves, the members of the 
Committee are collectively responsible to no one. 
The Achievements and Difficulties of the Common Mariet 
In spite _of considerable publicity provoking a 
certain uneasiness among the Community's neighbors, tbe 
. ,·14 
Baas, op. cit., p. 1371 • 
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achievements of the Common Market after nearly- seven yeara 
,, .. 
ot operation are more- th-an modest when compared with the 
Treaty goals established for the intitial periods. Never-
I 
tbeless, the only field where the Common Market fully auc-
ceeded was in its tciriff policies. 
The original Treaty of 1957 allowed 12 to 15 year• 
tor progressive elimination of internal tariffs and quotas 
and for adjustment of external tariffs to a common level. 
This transition period was broken into three sta@es, of 
four to five years each. In 1960, however, the Six agreed 
to speed up this timetable, and they accelerated tariff 
adjustments still further in 1962. Hy July 1, 1963, inter-
nal tariffs l1ad been cut to 40% of their 1957 lev·,els. 
Although the rate of further tariff cutting may be speeded 
up or slowed down (depending on unanimous agreement among 
the Six), the target date for complete elimination of 
internal tariffs is now the end of 1966. Quantitative ia-
' 
port restrictions (quotas) among the Six also are to be 
abolished over the transition period. On industrial pro-
ducts~ quotas within the Community were eliminated by the 
end of 19610 On other goods, the target date is 1970. 
Meanwhile, no new import quotas may be introduced. 
At the end of the transition period, the Six will 
' 
levy the same ta.rift· on products from outside the Common 
For most products this tariff will be based on 
the arithmetic average of the four coustoms areas -- France, 
Germany, Italy, and Benelux • 
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The Rome Treaty calls for the EEC countries to 
adjust their tariffs to this average in three steps. The 
first step took place on December 31, 1960, and the second 
.. 
on July 1 9 1963-===- two and a half years ahead of schedule. 
Target date for the final step is naw 1966. The final 
level of the common external tariff will depend on the 
outcome of reciprocal trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in which the Si• now bargain 
as a unit. The EEC countries have offered to reduce their 
external tariffs in exchange for concessions from other 
nations, and substantial reductions could result from the 
negotiations sought by the United States under the U.S. 
Trad·e Expansion Act. In anticipation of successful tariff 
bargaining under GATT, the EEC decided on a provisional 
20~ reduction of the originally agreed upon external tarifill. 
Particularly complicated and probably th~ weakest 
side of the Common Market is ite: agricultural policy. The 
Co11muni-ty' s agriculture represents a complex of social, 
political, and econornic problems, because unlike industry 
or trade European agriculture is closely tied to national 
economies within the framework of which it is sl>sidized in 
one way or another. As a rule, with a few regional ex-
ceptions, ii1e Community's agriculture is .. declining in 
efficie~cy and productivity. This is especlally true as 
one m~ves toward the sputh. The Corromon l\tarrlcet "s ideal is 
to improve·" the production of the rural areas and turn the 
peasants into modern farmers. But such a policy is a 
; ........ 
·,;, 
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radical departure from the existing pattern, and is viewed 
with suspicion by the rural interest groups as a "leap into 
the wiknown."15 All the Community member governments 
depend considerably on the rural vote and support and must 
therefore app~ the agricultural integration with caution. 
Agreement on a common agricultural policy has 
~ 
been lacking until recently. The Rome Treaty specifies 
that the Common Market extend to agriculture, which im-
plies equal prices in farm ·products throughout the co1111u-
nity by 1970. One of the main difficulties has arisen 
from the differences in price levels and farm policies 1 
among the EEC countries. However, after extensive negotia-
tions, the first significant agreement on agricultural 
regulations among the Six was reached at the end of 1963 
and previded for common marketing and pricing systems 
throughout the Community. Further progress in 1964 waa 
noted in the harmonization of cereal prices. 
The Six intend to cooedinate their monetary and 
fiscal policies during the transition period. Consultation····· .. ·-· 
and harmonization in these matters are in the process of 
I 
being developed further. The six EEC countries are slowly 
but perceptibly moving toward closer integration of other_ 
and more controversial policies. Additionally, there ~as 
been a noticeable measure of cooperation in economic and. 
15 See "L'Agriculture et le March, Commun,• Le Monde, 
October 28, 1960;"Dr. Ad.enaur's Farm Probiem,"Economi~~. 
CXCXVII(August 13, 1960), po 631 ~ and "Italy in 1lvo 
~enturies,"Economist,CXCXVII(October 2, 1960), 117ft. 
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aocial problems within the community such aa, tranaporta-. 
tion, patents energy and special financing. 
---\"· 
- ~~YThe discussion of problems thus far has been 
entirely in terms of the integration of the Metropolitan 
European countries themselves. Particular concern has been 
expressed, as well, over certain problems implicit in the 
proposed arrangement for relating the EEC with the over-
. 16 
seas territories of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The African upheavals developed during and since 
the operations of the EEC and the association of the over-
I 
seas territories was surpassed by the speed of political 
events which the drafters did not foresee. Disregarding 
the present rather confused situation, the association of 
the overseas territories to the Community should not be 
written off. Once the agitation is quieted and past dif-
ferences are forgotten, the association may prove mutually 
useful, facilitating for the emerging African states the 
access to "Little EuropeAs" markets, capital, and services 
and for the Community access to essential raw materials. 
The association, originally intended as an instrument of 
colonial policy, may well serve in the future as a basis 
for a new relationship between the two continents • 
Tbe Ruropea~ Free Trade Association 
Britain and a nWDber of other European nation• 
16 The overseas countries and territories to which the 
provisions apply are set out in Annex IV to the Treaty. 
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taYored the idea of free trade, but were hesitant about 
the concomitant loss of national sovereignty. They felt 
that further economic integrstioD of Europe should follow 
the cooperati·ve pattern of OEEC rather than the supra-
national approach of the Coal and Steel Communityo Objec-
tions to :the EEC 9 s plan for a common external tariff were 
raised by some nati.ons -==- notably Britain, whose trade 
with the commonweal th is based -on a system of preferential 
tariffs. 
Britain then took the lead in proposing the crea-
tion of a wide European Free Trade Area, which would not 
have any supra-national authority and would leave each 
•ember free to set its own tariffs against the outside 
world. The European Free Trade Association, generally 
known as the "Outer Seven," was thus established as a 
reaction and countermeasure to the possible effects of the 
Common Market. While the Common n1arl<et Treaty is regarded 
as a political instrument, the EFTA is an undertaking for 
economic and commercial purposes, 17 and liaited to trade 
only. 
The Association comprises Seven states -- Br~tail\ 
Portugal, Austria, Sivi tzerla11d j Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
. 
spread over the European continent. The Association counts 
94 million~ inhabitants, a:.little more than half of· the 
population of the European Community, but its population 
bas on the average a higher standard of living and the sma 
17 Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et Oppuers , "Parliamentary ,4s-pefts of the Six and the Eight," Parl~amentary Af,aira, XIII(Autumn, 1960), p.411. 
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of ~ts gross national products is about two-thirds of that 
of the nsix~ The majority of the members are industrial 
and trading nations with considerable specialized industrial, 
and its members even more so than those of the Community 
are depeimdent on trade. The only l inl{ of . political nature 
Between the Seven was in~itial reluctance, although differ-
ently motivated, to join the European Community. Particu-
larly complicated are the British feelings toward the Co•-
munityo In Britain the Common Market caused considerable 
soul-searching, and hesitation bettveen clear rejection or 
a half-hearted attempt to find some compromise solution 
inabling Britain to join the Community without committing 
herself to the program of political integration. 
The British official reasons for nonparticipation 
were (1) that the supranational idea is incompatible with 
the tiritish principle of parliamentary supremacy, (2) her 
strong ties with the Comnionwealth, and (3) til1at Britain, 
basically a·trading nation, depends on the world outside 
.of Europe for 75 per cent of her daily living. But prob-
ably the strongest although not officially expressed rea-
son is the centuries-old political attitude shared by 
the whole nation that to enter into a permanent political 
·-·-· 
ubion with the European continent would be "an act of 
· · .18· ~ desperate follyo" 
. . ·~- -
A number of tbe Aasociation ae .. bera, mainly 
.. ~ ...... ~ 
1s· John Alan May, "A British View of the Atlantic Union,• 
The Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1960 • 
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Aaatria, Sweden and Switzerland, are neutrals who finj it 
incompatible to join the Community, too closely identified 
'. ''.'. ( •. '' :·· ~ 
with the Western military alliance system. The inclusion 
of Denmark, Norway, and Portugal were dictated by economic 
reasons, the traditionally close relation$ between Portugal 
and Britain, and, in the case of Norway and Denmark, the 
strong ties to both Siveden and Britain. 
When the Community governments decided, in April, 
1960, to reduce the tariffs at a greater speed and estab-
lish a common tariff against the outside countries 9 the 
Free Trade Association members decided in September to re-
duce their inner tariffs at a greater speed, too. The rift 
between the Six and the Seven divided Western Europe into 
two camps with m1foreseeable repercussions, not only for 
the West European economy but, as well, for the future 
relationship of the two groups and certainly for the future 
prospects of West European unitye 19 
In 1961, Britain made a formal application for 
EEC membership and opened negotiations with the Six to 
frame the conditions of entry. The other EFI'A countries 
• ,. . . ... Ii 
also sought membership or association with EEC. Hy the 
end of 1962i a large number, though by no means all, of 
the economic issueS- between Britain and the EEC bad been 
negotiated, but the negotiations .still b·ung on a basic 
19oouglas G. Valentine,"The Free Trade Association and tbe 
Conunon Market Compared, "The Modern Law Review, XXIII, (May, 1960), ·p. 297~ 
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political q11estion: ·Could the EEC admit Britain to member-
ship and still develop in the direction preferred by its 
original members? In Januar~, 1963, · the negotiations 
collapsed because a .unanimous agreement on this question 
'" ' ' •, ' 
) 
could not be reached. Al though, EFTA seemed doom·ed t'tJhen 
Britain applied for membership, -new life has been breathed 
-
into the organization technically and ecoaomicallyo Indeed, 
since the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations in Jan-
uary, 1963, EF'TA has assumed new importance. 
All of this is the Association(' s past and present 
history. Its future is less certain. As it is not a unit 
now, in the Common Market sense, neither does it aspire 
to become', one. Rather, it aspires eventually to blend 
into a larger European unit. 
\-
The Fifth Republic and the Malaise .2£. the Community 
The retuJr'ln to po~tJe:rc' of de Gaulle on fv1ay 13,1958, 
aarke.d a turning-point in the development ofl tl1e Community. 
De Gaulle's election to the Presidency of the Fifth Re-
public and his appointment of Michel Debr, as prime minis-
ter were received with mixed feelings by the supporters 
· of· the Com1nuni ty,. On the French political scene de· Gaulle 
represented a self-centered and self-assertive nationalism 
which ha.d been opposed to every attempt at supranationa;t 
,-, 
cooperatio~, including the Schuman Plan and the European 
Defense co·~!nuni ty o Fra11ce, -in de Gaulle's view, n1ust 
remain free, sovereign, independent, and French, as it 
:.,: 
' . 
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bas a great mission to accomplish in Europe as in.the 
world. De Gaulle rejected supranationalism on the ground 
that it would destroy all the sacrosanct values which had 
made France the Great Nation. 20 The General was not op-
posed to the European idea, but he stressed that, in his 
view, the most suitable form of West European cooperation 
would be a coalition of the continental states led by 
France. 
De Gaulle drew his blueprint of Europe for the 
first time in Volume III of his "\Var l\iemoirs ,." tvhere, re-
ferring to the period immediately following the Second 
World War, be wrote: 
"I intended to persuade the states along the 
Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to form~a 
political, economic and strategic bloc; to 
establish this organization as one of the 
three ,r1ox") ldl pov1ers and sl"llould it become ne-
cessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet 
and Angloc,,American campson 21 
The United Europe de Gaulle seeks is different in its 
, 
foundations from what the other proponents of European 
·unity have in mind. "Now what are the realities of Europe.f 
What are the pillars on which it can be built?" De Gaulle 
asked in his press conference of September 5, 1960. 
"The states are~ in truth, certainly very 
different from one another, each of which 
bas its own ~pirit 9 its own history, its 
own language, its otJn-- miaf oR,..iunes 9 glories· 
and arnbi tions; bUJ1t these states are the only 
entities t.tat have the right to orde1°) ru1d the 
authority to act. To imagine that something 
IOeans ~obn, "Western Europe and Atlantic Unity," Current 
Histori, XXXIX~(September, 1960) 
21Le Monde, September, 1960. 
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can be boil t _ that would be effectiv·e for action 
and that would be approved by the peoples out-
side and above the states ~ tl1is is a dream. "22 
The cornerstones of a Gaullist Europe, then~ must 
be the sovereign nation-states. These states, when united, 
"must not cease to be themselves" and will build their 
0 
union by means "of organized cooperation." The Franco-
German treaty of January 22, 1963, p·roviding for coordin-
ated n1ea.sures in foreign policy, defense, education and 
cultural exchanges, is a model of that kind of "organized 
cooperation." It is"an example which may be followed and 
a framework ,vhich niay be ~nlarged." 
Michel Deb1', during the early fifties, was the 
"European thinker" and to a certain extent the expert on 
European affairs oif the Gaullist movement. Like de Gaulle, 
he advocated a \Yest European coalition of sovereign sta-, 
bound together by ties of common economic and political 
interests, and opposed the unification of Western Europe~ 
through economic integration as politically unsound and 
incompatible with the principle of responsible govern-
ment. TheF· Fifth Republic, however, accepted all supra-
,;: 
national obligations of its predecessor as a Community 
member. In December, 1958, after the retirement of Louis 
Armand, Dehr,•s gover11!uent se\;urect tlje election of 
Etienne llirsch, disciple of Jean f\ionnet and the I.leading 
Community technocrat, as c~~irman of the Euratom t;ommis-
sion. On January 15, 1959, Debr~ advocated the fusion 
22 Ibid. 
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of Euratom with the ECSC High Authority to be followed 
up by the integration,. of al 1 energy resources of the 
Community. Debr6•s proposal was put on the agenda by 
the Council of Ministers for further study. This was the 
usual tvay to oblivion and rnarlced the high point of Debr'e's 
constructive interest in the Co1nmunity•s affairs. From 
then on the French government folloived tl1e line of a 
correct but rather unenthusiastic cooperation. 
' 
In the spring of 1960 when the chairman of the 
Common Market Commission, Walter Halltein, addressed~ 
memorandum to the Con1muni ty member go·vernments, calling 
for a speedins up of the Common Market programs,
23 the 
French policy toward the ~ommunity began to change. The 
new course was ar1noW1ced by de Gaulle himself in his 
speech of May 31, 19600 The General denounced the poli-
tical vacuwn in which the supranational councils of 
Euro·pe were working and proposed to replace the artifi-
cial supranational structure of the European Community 
by a confederacy of continental states, a Europe of 
"Fatherlands," which would close its ranks around Ft>ance 
as the natural leader of \Vestern Europe. De Gaulle 
1 
stressed his belief in international cooperation built 
on a realistic basis and proposed to establisl1 in the 
place of the many supranational councils 8.i:;single Euro-
.. 
pean Chancery, a type of permanent Council of Mibistera, 
23 New York Times, March 4 1 1960. 
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presided over by the representatives of each member .. 
1,/ 
government for a term of three months. De Gaulle also 
renounced the plans for administrative reorganization of 
the Coumunity as unnecessa,ry and already outmodedo 24 
A. few weeks later, on July .16, 1960, de Gaulle received 
Robert Schuman and Ren£ Pleveri. While praising both for 
their work ib improving the Franco-German relations and 
for their pioneering work toward European unity, he 
stressed his personal diagreement with the s·upranational 
conception of his visitors and attacked the "European 
Cor:1munity of tech_nocrats and parliamentarians°' as a 
house without foundationso 25 
By September 5, 1960, de Gaulle had outlined, 
his "Grand Design" of French foreign policy. Fiest be 
pro-posed to reorgani~e NATO on a ,vor ld-,vide basis under 
,) 
a directoriurn of the three ,vorld po,vers, the United 
States, France, and Britain, and replace the integrated 
forces by a coordinated system of national armies. Western 
Europe was to cease to denend for her security on the 
NATO integrated forces under a predominately American 
command, and for her economy on a weak supranational 
Community. The Americans, in de Gaulle 0 s belief, would 
leave Europe sooner or later, anu supranational insti~u-
tionstions were of no use in a time of crisiso In spite 
of ten years of supranational experiments, Western 
' 
24•1A Stun1uit for Europe?", Economist ,cXII ,(Aug.6,1960) 
25 Paris Match, No. 592 (August 13, 1960), p.27. 
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Europe remains as before a "Europe ot Fatherlands" where 
only the cooperation 0£ states could be a realistic step 
\ 
forward. The existing European ~ommunities should be cut 
~down to their technical fwtctions, and a new permanent 
intergovernmental secretariat should deal at the inter~ 
' 
national level with common European matters in the mili-
tary, economic, cultural, and social fields. The General 
also proposed to disband the present supranational European 
Assembly and replace it by a large body of delegates ap-
pointed by the member governments. The new European 
... 
organization should finally be approved by a popular 
referendum of the voters in the member states. 
Among the Western allies de Gaulle's speech caused_ 
a stir and astonishment, and among the Comrnuni ty members 
painful surprise. But the General only repeated and 
adjusted to new circumstances his old ideas which formed 
the ideological basis of the de Gaullist move~ent and whicb 
were now raised to the official ideology of the Fifth 
Republic. The Atlantic allies did not take ,de Gaulle's 
proposal for NATO's reorgani~ation seriously and no one, 
I,,., 
exceJJt a fevv of his die ...... hard p~tisans, believed that 
France co.uld become a leading military power. -But de 
Gaulle o S bwelief that tk1e iuH1iediate interests of ~iestern 
Europe would be better served if the governments and not 
. 
the supranational institutions would be the sources of 
power of "Little Europe" gained support among the French 
politicians. Some of the "confederationists," as they 
··r · , ,,.( 
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called themselves -- Maurice Faure, Alain Peyrefitte, 
and Ren~ p·1even - who since the · beginning played a proai-
. 
nent role in European politics, defended. de Gaulle's 
conception as based on a sense of realism. 26 They alED 
hoped that, while European unity would not be accomplished 
. 
at once, the confederacy could probably bridge the split 
of Western Europe and facilitate the cooperation ef Bri-
tain and Scandinavia. .,. 
De Gaulle's proposal of European reorganization 
on the nation-state basis met with a resolute opposition 
in Bonn and was received with polite coldness in the 
other Community capitals, even if it offered a certain 
hope that Britain and her Free Trade Area Association.J 
. ht t 11 . . th · t · 27 mig even ua y Join e new organiza ion. ~ Debre's 
visit in Bonn on October 8, 1960, did not ren1ove the 
differences between Chancellor Adenauer, committed to the 
.. 
supranatllOnal t;ommu11i ty, and General de Gaulle, advocating 
" the cog.federate "Europe of Fatherlands. But an agree-
ment was reached to postp9ne the Franco-German European 
dialogue until after the German federal ,election in 1961.28 
The opposing views of Chancellor Adenauer and 
General de Gaulle as to what the ultimate goal of the 
Community should be caused a latent political crisis 
within the Com~unity. In the early sixties a split among 
26 
27 
28 
Dale, op. cit., p. 126. 
New York Times, September 4, 1960. 
Economist, CXVII(October 15, 1960) 
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the Six-began to appear; the Germans and the French were 
engaged in a debate of the political future of the Com-
o 
mlinity; the Dutch, pessimistic about their prospects 
within the Common Market, were pl~ing with. the idea of 
joining the 890uter Seven; 0 the Belgians, Italians, and 
Luxembourgers were neutrally standing by. 
However, the administrative and technical work 
· of the two Community Com1nissions and the High Authority 
proceeded 11ormally. The Council of >.finisters agreed in 
October,, 1960, to accept Greece and Turkey as associate it 
members of the Community, while the association of Israel 
was placed under study. Hut the divergencies between 
Bonn and Paris prevented any agreement.of a political 
nature. The Community's political inertia became parti-
cularly apparent during the session of the European As-
sembly in October, 1960. The deputies had to resign 
themselves to the fact that as lon~ as the political 
discussion continues at the "European sum1ait" level, the 
Assen1bly is a powerless by-stander, unable to deal even 
with the 1nost elementary questions since unanimous 
agreement within ·the Cou11cil of i1inisters is required. 
The current political cl\i:ses of the Community 
reveal the weakness of the Comn1unity institutions and the 
relative limits of functionalism as a means to achieve 
political unity. Tl1e political future of· the Community 
depends tar aore on direct political action than on the 
• I 
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increase of trade within the Community. a9 This weak point 
in the func·tionalist approach was already pointed. out by · 
Maurice Faure, former French state secretary for ~ereign 
, affairs c11d one of the signers of the Common Market Treaty. 
In the Nove~ber, 1959, session of the European Assembly~O 
T 
be stated that the customs union i.s the 'easiest point 
in the T~eaty to realize, but instead of leading to the 
European political community, it·would only divide Europe 
into two camps. He warned the Assembly that the Six are 
standing before a dilemma: Either they ,vill l1ave to 
generate a political will, which will create a political 
community, or, if they feel that this is at present beyond 
their means, they could drop the political plans for uni-
fication and be content with only a European economic 
\ 
association. They could then invite the ~liritish and 
Scandinavians to join them, which would still be a better 
solution than a divided Western Europe. 
) 
Wi thin ... the Community, the economic integration 
scored remarkable and lasting results. It brought to 
the six Community economies a certain coordination and 
planning, a11d its trends can no longer be reversed o Hut 
contrary to the expectations of the functionalists, a 
simil·ar impact of the Community institutions on the pol-
itical li£e of the member states did not occuro The Com-
u-ity still lacks political grassroots. European politic:al 
29"France and the Conunon Market, "Mancester Guardian Weekll, 
April ~8, 1964. 
30 Debats de l'Assembl~e ~~rop~enne(Session of Nov.,1959) pp.192f17 -
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life is still predominantly centered arpund the national 
ace~e, the events in Berlin, Algeria, or Congo being 
nearer to the public than the future organizational 
setting of the ~o~tnwi~ty. · This fact became particularly 
apparent during the early debates betv1een11 Chanoo.llor 
Adenauer and General de Gaulle over the ultimate goals 
of the Community. 
The ~ommunity institutions are in the stage of 
gradually pooling the national sovereignties, and in 
this they are favored by rnodern technology, the economy, 
and the techniques of mass production, factors that make 
necessary closer cooperation, larger space, and a certain 
degree of planning. The opposing forces of nationalism 
and particularism, around which European political life 
is still centered, cannot disappear overnight, andlwill 
make the way toward unity long and laborious. 
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,i CONCLUSIONS 
.. 
De Gaul·le' s conception of Europe bas been developd 
in op1)osi tion to the scl1ool of tl1ought ivhich has dominate.a 
, ' 
the actual processes of European unificati·on since the end 
of the Second World War. Its foremost spokesman and 
states,nan has been Jean Pilormet, and its monuments are the 
European Coal and St eel Comn1uni ty, the European Atomic 
Energy Community, the Common Market. Its philosophy is 
"functional." The functional approach to unification would 
"overlay political divisions with a spreading web of inter-
national activities and agencies, in which and through 
which the interests and life of all nations would be 
gradually integrated ••• It would help the growth ••• of 
cominon habits a.Qd interests, malci11g frontier l i11es mean-
··~·•,- [ _______ ,. __ ~ .. ·-·-•,,,, t 
ingless by overlaying them with a natural growth of com-
mon administrative agenci_e,,s. n31 
The Euro~e~n communities try to solve common 
problems, which Do one of the member states could have 
solved by its own efforts, throug9 the coordination of 
technical function on a supranational level. The recent 
negotiations among the members of the Common Market, 
seeking a, com,non agricultural policy, are a case in poi·nt • 
• 
These negotiations were of the traditional interQational 
. ' 
.character in that they were predicate~ upon the equality 
31 David Mitrany, op. cit., p.21. 
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of all states. Yet once these negot,t.at:Lons culminated 
in an agree1nent, its execution rested in tl1e hands of 
1'! 
supr-a11ational agencies which though within still relative• · 
• I 
narrow limits, perform the functions of a genuine federal 
government. 
Supporters of this approach expect the example 
of the existing European Communities, which have created 
a European bond of interest within limited technical 
spheres, to spread to other fields, such as transport, 
electricity, defense. Finally, it is hoped that poli-
tical unity will grow organically out of this accumula-
tion of technical agreements. Once all these functional 
organizations l:1ave been established as going -co11cerns, 
sovereignty"will have been transferred in fact to a co•-
mon government by gradual steps. 
' . 
The men behind the ·European ComJnuni ty put too 
much stress and too much faith in the functionalist 
approa~h, believing that a relatively moderate govern-
ment intervention in- "Little Euro·pe 's" national economiea 
would provide, if coordinated at a supranationalevel, an 
impulse strong enough f'or the Conununity • s i11tegration. 
The dynamics of the economic life and time would do the 
rest. They foresaw that the ingegration policy would 
. ,· 
face difficulties and delays, but thought nevertheless 
. that the :nost difficult obstacles were already overcoae. 
A decade of cold war strengthened their presumption that 
Communism represented the main and virtually the only 
/, 
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political danger that the Gommunity had to face. This 
belief led them to underestimate the vigor of the national 
forces in the associated overseas territories and the re-
vival of French nationalism within the Community itself. 
The new ~ommunity insitutions had barely started 
their operations when, in May, 1958, political events in 
France brought de Gaulle to power, a man whose political 
record indicated views basically opposed to the supra-
natio11al cooperation depended now on the hope that de 
Gaulle's former attitude would change, and that once in 
power he would ultimately accept the community in itf 
actual form. 
In spite of de Gaulle's initial moderation, hia 
nationalist political conception anct bis belief in the 
historic mission of France both in Europe and overseas 
could not be reconciled with the idea of a supranational 
European community. He feared that within the European 
Comrauni ty France, because of her economically \veaker 
position, would for a long time necessarily play a 
-
secondary role. De Gaulle also objected to the European 
Community as ~uch. He held that the supranational idea 
undermined the national S}Jiri t and \ralues, and that the 
European supranational organizations after a decade of 
their existence still remained without noticeable popu-
lar support, being created and· animated only by a few 
professional politicians. 
In de Gaulle's view only the nation-state 
• 
• 
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represents a true organic unity; therefore, European 
cooperation must rest-not on the present artificial 
supranational organizations,but on a confederacy.of soY-
ereign~national states grouped around France. Only a 
Euro1)ean confederacy based on the idea of a 0 Euro1Je of 
Fatherla.n~s" can help \Vestern Europe regain its s trengtb 
and self-respect. De Gaulle proposed to replace the 
present European organizations, which he ·believed are not 
only artificial but also unable to survive a serious 
international crisis, by a single Chancery, a per1nanent 
Council of Ministers, and four Secretariats,dealing with 
political, economic, military and cultural matters. A 
European plebiscite would gtjve to the new organization 
popular approval. 
Certain points in de Gaulle's criticism of the 
Economic Cominunity are justified. After nearly a ciecade 
the European supranational organizations are still oper-
ati11g wi thi11 t11eir own limited circles and have repeat-
edly failed to gain broad popular support for their 
ultimate goal of a West European .political unity. The 
t' 
nation-state represe11ting the nEurope of Fatherlands" 
is ·still today the pplitical reality on which the West 
European public life is centered. But de Gaulle's, .. con-
federacy, .. bas~d on the sovereign national states, how,ever 
politically realistic it seems to be, has little chance 
of prevailing. The supranational organizations, even 
if lacking popular support, have already made a consi-
derable inroad into the nation-state system. For her 
.. 
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defense, Western Europe is dependent on NATO, backed 
by the United States, and within the Eul"0 Qpean Community 
\, the present achievement of economic integration cannot 
be reversed. Though de Gaulle' s'·)>olicy did not gain 
. ,.c 
favor in the other countries of ttLi ttle Europe" his 
unfavorable attitude tot1}.Tard the present system of. co-
operation caused a serious cirsis within the European L.._ 
Community and brought it to a political standstill. 
But perhaps de Gaulle is right in doubting 
that the nation-states can gradually merge their res-
pective sovereignties into a higher political authority. 
That doubt is borne out by the wap European nation-states, 
especially Germany and Italy in the 19th Century were 
united. In each case a new center of political. power 
bad to emerge, come into conflict with the local centers,-
and finally prevail over them. However, de Gaulle can 
only proclaim this political truth about European uni-
fication. He-lacks the power to act upon it in an 
affirmative way. 
The functionalists, for their part, lack de 
Gaulle's political insight. They naively assume that 
political m1ification of Europe will somehow take care 
,, 
of itself, and that th-is qualitative transformation will 
result rrom the quantitative increase of functional agen-
cies. On the other 11and, the functionalists 0 have supplied 
the indispensable material foundation for the political 
unification of Europe. They have created common econoaic 
- ' ,,. 
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and technological interests, protected and proaoted by 
common institutions. 
The European Community in spite of numerous 
~ 
delays and obstacles succeeded, through supranational 
cooperation and a certain amount of planning, in changing 
considerably and irreversibly the economies of the 
member states. But every political crisis, and parti-
cular,ly ·those occasioned by de Gaulle, revealed the 
weaknesses and re'lative limitations of functionalism 
as a political means to achieve European unity. The 
idea of European unity as embodied in the European Com-
munity is too closely linked to specialized technical 
fields, ,vhich, however important, are unable alone to 
attract popular imagination and support. Between the 
European supranational organizations and the masses of 
the E~~opean people stands the nation-state, still the 
center of political interest. 
European unity will one day- be achieved be-
cause the European nation-state system cannot fulfill 
the requirements of a modern, technical civilization. 
Hut the advance will continue to be character·ized by 
detours and a p,ai~ful search for new formso Fifteen 
years ago, Europeans were united througQ common bonds 
0£ peril and privation. .They shared the same vision, 
the ~oiitical and economic integration of the six nations-
,r~ , 
into a United States of Europ~. But the ~uropeans of 
1949 are not the Europeans of 1964; and it now seems 
,, 
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certain. that the Europe of 1970 will not be the saae. 
Europe envisioned 15 years ago. 
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